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3Introduction: Objectives of this Benchmarking Study
This automobile study for Toyota Motor Corporation (TMC) was completed
under a three-year research grant from the Sloan Foundation. The project’s overall
purpose has been to examine in a series of case studies how U.S. and Japanese firms
which are recognized leaders in using information technology (IT)1 t  achieve long-
term sustainable advantage have organized and managed this process. While each
case is complete in itself, each is part of this larger study.2
This case for a large automobile producer, together with other cases, support an
initial research hypothesis that leading software users in the U.S. and Japan are very
sophisticated in the ways they have integrated software into their business strategies.
They use IT to institutionalize organizational strengths and capture tacit knowledge on an
iterative basis. In Japan this strategy has involved heavy reliance on customized and
semi-customized software (Rapp 1995) but is changing towards a more selective use of
package software managed via customized systems. This case is illustrated by Toyota’s
development of its system to automate its traditional “just-in-time” (JIT) ordering from
suppliers, its new intelligent transportation system (ITS) and its new smart cars.
Conversely, U.S. firms, such as Merck, who have often relied more on packaged
                                         
1
 In this paper and the study, software, information technology (IT) and systems are used interchangeably. In addition,
when referring to the firm as a whole, the text uses “it”, but when referring to management, “they” is used.
2 There is no comparable US auto company case. However, the industries and firms examined are food retailing (Ito-
Yokado), semiconductors (NEC and AMD), pharmaceuticals (Takeda and Merck), retail banking (Sanwa and
Citibank), investment banking (Nomura and Credit Suisse First Boston), life insurance (Meiji and Nationwide), autos
(Toyota), steel (integrated mills and mini-mills, Nippon Steel, Tokyo Steel and Nucor), and apparel retailing (Isetan
and Federated).  Nationwide has replaced USAA, as the latter was unable to participate. These industries and cases
were generally selected based on the advice and research of specific industry centers funded by the Sloan Foundation.
These are the computer and software center at Stanford, the semiconductor and software centers at Berkeley, the
financial services center at Wharton, the pharmaceutical and auto centers at MIT, the steel project at Carnegie-Mellon,
the food services project at the University of Minnesota and the apparel center at Harvard. The case writer and research
team for this case thus wish to express their appreciation to the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation for making this work
possible and to the Sloan industry centers for their invaluable assistance. They especially appreciate the guidance given
by the auto center at MIT as well as the staff at Toyota who were so generous with their time. Still, the views expressed
in this case are those of the author and are not necessarily those of Toyota or its management.
4software, are now customizing more.  This is especially true for the systems needed to
integrate software packages into something more closely linked with a firm’s business
strategies, markets, and organizational structure.
Thus, coming from different directions, there appears to be convergence in the
strategic approach of these leading software users. The cases confirm what some other
analysts have hypothesized; a coherent business strategy is a necessary condition for a
successful IT strategy (Wold and Shriver 1993).3 These strategic links for Toyota and
Japan’s automobile industry are presented in the following study.4
Business strategies are important in understanding IT strategies. This case along
with the other case studies illustrate that the implementation and design of each
company’s software and software strategy is unique to its competitive situation, industry,
and strategic objectives. These factors influence how each chooses between packaged and
                                         
3 These and other summary results are presented in another Center on Japanese Economy and Business working paper:
William V. Rapp, “Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage Through Information Technology: The Emergence of
Controlled Production,” December 1998. Also see: William V. Rapp, “Gaining and Sustaining Long-term Advantage
Using Information Technology: Emergence of Controlled Production,” Best Papers Proceedings, Association of
Japanese Business Studies, Salt Lake City, UT, June 1999.
4 All the cases are being written with a strategic focus.  That is, each examines a firm’s IT strategy rather than the
specific software or IT systems used. In this sense, they illustrate how IT is used to improve competitiveness rather
than what specific software a firm is using. The latter is generally only noted to illustrate and explain the former. This
emphasis was not specified when the project began but evolved as research progressed. There are three major reasons
the cases became focused this way. First, at a detailed level, all these firms have unique software and IT systems due to
the way each weaves organization with packaged and custom software. There is thus little others could learn if a study
just explained each firm’s detailed IT system or systems. Further, the cases would be long and would quickly drown the
reader in data since IT pervades all aspects of these very large corporations. This was apparent at an early stage in the
research when the project team tried to develop IT organization charts for Takeda, Merck and NEC. The second reason
is that at a general level, differences in firm IT systems can be almost trivial since there are only a limited number of
operating system options, e.g. IBM mainframes, Unix workstations, and Windows or MAC based PCs.  Third,
information technology changes very rapidly and thus each firm is constantly upgrading and evolving its systems. So
detailed descriptions of each IT system would rapidly become obsolete. For these reasons, focusing the cases on
strategic principles developed as the best way to explain to readers something they could use and apply in their own
situations. This reasoning has been confirmed when the material has been presented in different forums as discussants
have commented favorably on the approach. Equally importantly, in our interviews and conversations with
management, this is where they have focused their responses. That is, as the various cases illustrate, the firms manage
their IT decision-making by following a set of strategic principles integrated with their view of their competitive
environments. This is similar to Nelson and Wi ter's (1982) rules and routines for other kinds of management decisions
and innovations, and illustrates these firms’ evolutionary approach to IT use and development. Their basic reasons for
this incorporate the points noted above, i.e. each firm’s unique system, the limited operating system options, and IT’s
rapid technical change. Based on what the case study teams have learned, therefore, it is these firms’ strategic
approaches, including the concept of controlled production explained later, that seem to have the widest applicability
5customized software options to achieve specific goals, and how each measures its
success. Indeed, as part of each firm’s strategic integration, Toyota and the other leading
software users examined, have linked their software strategies with their overall
management goals through clear mission statements that explicitly note the importance of
information technology to the success of the firm.
Each has also coupled this view with active CIO (Chief Information Officer) and
IT-support group participation in the firm’s business and decision-making structure. Thus
for firms such as TMC the totally independent MIS (Management Information Systems)
department is a thing of the past. This may be one reason why out-sourcing has not been
a real option for TMC, except to captive subsidiaries (Rapp 1995).  The company’s
successful business performance in automobiles and other vehicles is not based solely on
software, however. Instead, as is described below, software is an integral element within
its overall management strategy with respect to producing, selling and servicing
automobiles. It also plays a key role in serving corporate goals such as enhancing plant
productivity by improving production scheduling, reducing inventories or strengthening
customer relations. The systems are thus coupled with the company’s approach to
marketing, design, production, customer service, new product development and constant
cost reduction. This reflects Toyota’s clear understanding of its business, its industry, and
its competitive strengths within the context of its industry.
This clear business vision, especially of the smart car, smart design and smart
production strategies described below, has enabled TMC’s management to select,
develop and use the software they believe is required to assist TMC’s plants to operate at
                                                                                                                   
and offer other organizations the most potential insights without becoming dated in how to use IT to improve
competitiveness. The detailed strategy described here, though, only applies to vehicle production and primarily autos.
6a higher and more consistent level of performance and customer support. In turn, TMC
has integrated this support to its plants into a total support system for the firm, including
its overseas affiliates, which is coupled with the company’s overall operations including
parts and steel ordering. Since this vision impacts other corporate decisions, TMC has
also developed good human resource and financial characteristics (see Appendices I & II
on Strategy & Operations as well as Firm & Industry Data).
Toyota does share some common IT approaches with other leading software
users, such as the creation of large proprietary interactive databases that promote
automatic feedback between various stages of the design, order, production, delivery, and
the service process. Its ability to use IT to economize on traditional production systems
and inventory practices, such as the amount of steel that must be held for various
automobile models, is also a common issue for other leading software users. In addition,
TMC has been able organizationally and competitively to build beneficial feedback
cycles or loops that increase productivity in areas as different as design, customer
warranty service and product availability while reducing cycle times and improving the
production and delivery of products and replacement parts to the customer.
TMC’s management recognizes that better cycle times between client orders and
ultimate delivery reduce costs and improve business forecasts since projections are for
shorter periods (Fujimoto 1999). Similarly, more rapid design cycles more quickly
incorporate the latest technologies in its new model cars (Sealy 1991 and Sobek 1997).
Therefore, customer satisfaction is improved through the more timely completion of the
sales process as well as the constant product enhancement. One example of this use of IT
to improve competitiveness through faster cycle times is TMC’s new parallel and buffer
7stock production system that permits Toyota to reduce assembly times compared to the
traditional continuous track approach (Fujimoto 1999 and company visit). In sum, IT
inputs are critical factors in TMC’s and other leading users’ overall business strategies,
yielding strong positive results for doing it well and posing potentially negative
implications for competitors.
An important consideration in this respect is the apparent emergence of a new
strategic production paradigm, “controlled production” (“CP”), where TMC is clearly a
leader. Mass production dramatically improved on craft production through economies of
scale using standardized products, and lean production improved on mass production by
making production more continuous and tying it more closely to actual demand.
“Controlled” production seems to significantly improve productivity through monitoring,
controlling and linking every aspect of producing and delivering a product or service,
including after sales support and product changes. Such effects are described for Toyota
in what follows in terms of its new smart car combined with its smart design and smart
production scheduling.
However, controlled production (CP) is only possible by a firm actively using IT
systems to continuously monitor and control functions that were previously parts of a
business structure that only responded to changes in expected or actual demand. Now it
can actually influence or stimulate those changes. This may be why such firms and
several industry analysts see the skillful use of IT as important to these firms’ success,
including Toyota’s (Brogan 1997a and Matsushima 1998). But this is only true when IT
is integrated with the firm’s business from an operation, product and organization
standpoint, reflecting its overall business strategy and clear competitive vision.
8This is one reason why at Toyota the software and systems development people
are part of the decision-making structure within each plant and operation. So Seagate
Technology is certainly correct for Toyota when it states in its 1997 Annual Report: “We
are experiencing a new industrial revolution, one more powerful than any before it.
In this emerging digital world of the Third Millennium, the new currency will be
information. How we harness it will mean the difference between success and
failure, between having competitive advantage and being an also-ran.”
However, the key in TMC’s case to using IT successfully, as with the other
leading software users examined, is to develop a mix of packaged and customized
systems that support the firm’s business strategies and differentiate it from competitors.
TMC’s management has achieved this by using IT to enhance its organizational and
product strengths rather than trying to adapt TMC’s organizational structure or products
to the software used. They have also looked to functional and market gains to justify the
additional expense incurred in customizing certain systems, including the related costs of
integrating customized and packaged software into a single IT system while training
employees to use it. This integration is done by first assessing the possible business uses
of software within the organization, its operations and its products. Particular focus is
placed on IT’s role in enhancing Toyota’s core competencies in developing, producing
and delivering many different qualities and types of vehicles (Appendix II). Management
therefore rejects the view that IT systems are generic products best developed by outside
vendors who achieve low cost through economies of scale and who can more easily
afford to invest in the latest technologies.5
                                         
5 Toyota and the other cases have been developed using a common methodology that examines cross-national pairs of
firms in key industries. In principle, each pair of cases focuses on a Japanese and American firm in an industry where
9Approach: Methodology and Questions
In undertaking this and the other cases to assess the importance for each firm of
the IT related issues noted above, the project team sought to answer key questions while
recognizing firm, country, and industry differences. These have been explained in the
summary paper referenced in footnote 3 and are set forth for Toyota in Appendix I as
well. TMC’s profile is presented there based on company interviews and other research.
Readers that wish to assess Toyota’s strategies and approaches to using IT in summary
form prior to reading the case may find it a useful outline.6
                                                                                                                   
software is a significant and successful input into competitive performance.  Excepting Nationwide Insurance, the firms
examined are ones recommended by the Sloan industry centers as ones using IT successfully. A leading securities
analyst recommended Nationwide as a replacement for USAA. So all are recognized by their industries as being good
at using IT to improve competitiveness. To develop these “best-practice” studies the research team combined analysis
of current research results with questionnaires and direct interviews. Further, to relate these materials to previous work
as well as the expertise located in each industry center, the team talked with the industry centers. In addition, it coupled
new questionnaires with the materials used in a previous study to either update or obtain a questionnaire similar to the
one used in the 1993-95 research (Rapp 1995). This method enabled the researchers to relate each candidate and
industry to earlier results. The team also worked with the different industry centers to develop a set of questions that
specifically relate to a firm’s business strategy and software’s role within that. Some questions address issues that
appear relatively general across industries such as inventory control. Others such as managing the IC manufacturing
process are more specific to a particular industry. The focus has been to establish the firm’s perception of its industry
and its competitive position as well as its advantage in developing and using a software strategy. The team also
contacted customers, competitors, and industry analysts to determine whether competitive benefits or impacts
perceived by the firm were recognized outside the organization. These sources provided additional data on measures of
competitiveness as well as industry strategies and structure. The case studies are thus based on detailed interviews by
the project team on IT’s use and integration into management strategies to improve competitiveness in specific
industries, augmenting existing data on industry dynamics, firm organizational structure and management strategy
collected from the industry centers. Further, data was gathered from outside sources and firms or organizations that had
helped in the earlier project. Finally, the US and Japanese companies in each industry were selected based on being
perceived as successfully using software in a key role in their competitive strategies. In turn, each firm saw its use of
software in this manner while the competitive benefits were generally confirmed after further research. In the case of
automobiles the team was particularly aided by presentations given by the MIT automobile group at the annual Sloan
Industry Center Meetings from 1997-99 as well as the book produced by that Center (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990).
6
 The questions are broken into the following categories: General Management and Corporate Strategy, Industry
Related Issues, Competition, Country Related Issues, IT Strategy, IT Operations, Human Resources and Organization,
Various Measures such as Inventory Control, Cycle Times and Cost Reduction, and finally some Conclusions and
Results. The questions cover a range of issues from direct use of software to achieve competitive advantage, to
corporate strategy, to criteria for selecting software, to industry economics, to measures of success, to organizational
integration, to beneficial loops, to training and institutional dynamics, and finally to inter-industry comparisons. These
are summarized for Toyota in Appendix I.
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Introduction to Case
The TMC case begins by placing Japan’s automobile industry in a competitive
context and then examines the governmental policies, economic factors, and competitive
dynamics affecting the Japanese and global automobile markets and its producers. As
Japan's leading auto producer, and one of the world’s largest (Appendix II), Toyota's
evolution, competitive situation and current strategies are integral to this picture. Its
situation illustrates well many of the competitive issues facing the world automobile
industry. As competitive pressures mount, many Japanese firms are being absorbed by
global groupings such as GM, Ford, Daimler-Chrysler, and Renault. These expanding
groups are aggressively challenging the leading Japanese producers, Toyota and Honda,
in both export and domestic markets. It is therefore critical to TMC’s long-term strategy
that it successfully maintains its position, as the world’s most efficient vehicle producer,
while managing its planned transition to a new competitive model (Appendix II).
This is because vehicle production and related businesses, such as replacement
parts and finance, represent virtually all its revenues, operating earnings and invested
capital (Table 11). At the same time, TMC’s organizational structure and software
product choices help one understand the company's use and demand for IT while the case
describes how it is using and plans to use IT as a tool to create a competitive advantage in
producing, selling and delivering automobiles. But to appreciate IT’s role within TMC,
some auto industry, market and economic characteristics need to be explained.
The Industry Context: The Japanese and Global Automobile Industries
“Since its establishment, Toyota’s principle has been to strive constantly to build
‘better products at lesser costs.’ To this end, Toyota has developed its own unique
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production method. This system is based on the idea of ‘just in time’ (i.e. producing only
the necessary amount of parts just at its needed time), the idea of Toyota Founder
Kiichiro Toyoda. This system also seeks to thoroughly eliminate all sorts of waste in
order to reduce prime costs. Toyota also places a maximum value on the human element,
allowing an individual worker to employ his capabilities to the fullest through
participation in the productive management, and improvement of his given job and its
environment. With the motto ‘Good Thinking, Good Products,’ each individual worker is
making his best effort to assure Toyota’s customers the highest quality product, with an
understanding that it is in his work process that quality is built in,” (TMC 1994).
Using these principles, by the late 1970s and early 1980s, TMC was firmly
established as the world’s most efficient and lowest cost producer of high quality
automobiles (Womack, Jones and Roos 1990 and Fujimoto 1999). The reasons for this
were then explained during the late 1980s through a series of studies organized by MIT’s
Automobile Industry Center culminating in 1990 in Womack, Jones and Roos’ seminal
work on lean production. As a result, U.S. and European producers became well aware of
lean production principles and have spent several years benchmarking and trying to catch
Toyota. In addition, they expanded through global groupings to combine global scale and
scope with improved design and manufacturing efficiency.
Therefore, competitive pressures began to shift significantly during the 1990s for
Japanese auto producers from two industry-based sources. One was the emergence of
these larger global and more efficient competitor groupings such as Ford, GM, Renault,
Daimler-Chrysler and Volkswagen. The second was the serious decline in domestic auto
demand as the Japanese economy felt the combined pressures of the Bubble collapse and
12
a continuing strong yen (TMC 1999, Brogan 1997a and Appendix II). On top of these
conditions, the strong yen made Japanese auto exports less competitive in world markets,
stimulating foreign direct investment (FDI) by Japanese producers, which further reduced
export demand for Japanese cars. As seen in Appendix II, these cumulative effects were
only moderately ameliorated by increased export demand due to a rapidly expanding
Asian economy. Indeed, due to local content and production requirements, Japan’s high
Asian market share did not help Japanese auto producers all that much in using excess
Japanese production capacity despite the region’s rapid growth. In 1995, for example, out
of total vehicle sales of about 3.9 million units in Asian markets other than Japan,
roughly 3.5 million units in total were produced in those Asian countries (including
exports outside of Asia). In turn only 600,000 units were imported from Japan, which
was only a 100,000 units’ increase from 1991. So the impact of Asia’s economic
expansion during this period on Japanese vehicle exports and production capacity
utilization was fairly modest (MacKnight 1997).
While Japanese vehicle shipments (exports plus domestic demand) hit an all time
high of 13.6 million units toward the end of 1991, domestic production peaked at 13.5
million in 1990 with the end of the Bubble. It subsequently fell to 10 million units by
1998 (TMC 1999). Further as indicated in Table 3 (Appendix II), exports fell from about
6.6 million units in 1986 to 3.3 million in 1998, while domestic demand, which peaked in
1990 at 7.8 million units, fell by about 1 million units during the 1990s. At the same time,
overseas production rose dramatically from very low levels in 1986 to several million
units a year by 1998 (Tables 3 and 8). So the combined and interactive effect of a strong
yen and FDI on exports has created substantial excess Japanese production capacity. The
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drop in domestic demand due to the recession has just added to that extra capacity.
Further, this extra capacity is unlikely to be absorbed via either a Japanese recovery or
exports since domestic demand is currently saturated at around 7 million units
(MacKnight 1997) and overseas production is still expanding.
However, this excess capacity has created real downward pressure on prices,
while increasing domestic and export competition. Yen appreciation has had a direct
effect on profits and competition (Table 9), but there have been indirect and strategic
effects too. These stem from the fact that in a declining market, the low cost producer has
a great advantage. This is because that firm can afford to continue to invest in capacity
and research and development (R&D) as well as develop new models. It can also afford
to price lower to maintain market share and keep its factories operating profitably and
close to capacity.  In a capital-intensive fixed investment industry like automobiles, this
yields tremendous operating advantages that tend to compound over time since the
natural reaction of weaker competitors is to rationalize and cut back in areas like R&D,
capacity additions or new model development. If the decline in demand is short-term,
these actions may have minimal strategic effects. But when weaker demand and excess
capacity becomes protracted, as it has for Japan in the 1990s, the competitive effects of
decreased innovation and older-looking models become important since consumers
correctly perceive that the low-cost producer’s products are both cheaper and technically
superior. In addition, the low-cost producer can invest in new plant and equipment or
production capacity that can further increase cost competitiveness.
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This appears to have been the situation for Toyota and Honda compared to firms
such as Mazda, Nissan and Mitsubishi.7 As seen in Table 9, the latter tried to solve their
negative margin problems (Table 6) by rationalizing production and reducing or just
maintaining R&D. These solutions to the effects on automobile demand of the Bubble
collapse and a strong yen were generally not successful, though, since they did not close
the productivity gap with the industry leaders, Toyota and Honda (footnote 7). Toyota
particularly was able to continue to increase profits through process and product design
improvements while both Toyota and Honda expanded their product offerings (Table 9).
Throughout the 1990s Toyota and Honda remained profitable while their Japanese
competitors faced loses and more pressure to rationalize and keep R&D and model
changes low. Since Toyota and Honda continued and even increased their heavy R&D
investment and new model introduction, however, they were constantly able to bring new
and improved products to the market and especially innovative vehicles such as the
hybrid car (Tables 5 and 8; Brogan 1997a). But while this approach helped TMC to
maintain, and perhaps even improve, its competitiveness, it did not raise production at
TMC’s domestic plants. This is because TMC still had to lower domestic output as
production shifted overseas in response to a strong yen, weak domestic demand (Table
8), and foreign governments’ regulations and investment incentives (MacKnight 1997).
                                         
7 Fujimoto (1999) and Smitka (1993) note that in the 1970s and early 1980s Japanese automobile producers were the
world’s lowest cost. Fujimoto cites several studies that indicate Japan’s productivity advantage may have been double
the U.S. and three times Europe. At a 200 plus yen-dollar exchange rate this translated into an almost 50% cost
advantage. However, due to the strong yen, which roughly doubled its value after 1985, and the productivity gains of
Western producers, especially U.S. firms, “the overwhelming unit cost advantages of the average Japanese car maker
that existed in the early 1980s had been basically wiped out by the mid-1990s,” (Fujimoto 1999). This is why Smitka
(1993) was basically correct in predicting the Japanese industry’s decline. At the same time averages can disguise
substantial cost differentials among firms. So while Western producers had caught the Japanese average, “Toyota’s cost
advantage over other Japanese firms was estimated to be at least several hundred dollars per car in the early 1990s.”
Therefore, as seen in Appendix II, it was the relatively weaker Japanese firms and particularly Nissan that bore the
greatest effects of the change in market demand and global competitive pressures.
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This situation indicates how for Japanese automobile producers trade and
international competition now have a much different impact compared to the period
before September 1985 and the Plaza Accord’s impact on the global competitive
environment. Prior to the Accord the Japanese were the acknowledged cost leaders
worldwide in producing high quality small cars (Smitka 1993 and Fujimoto 1999). As
Smitka (1993) and Fujimoto (1999) explain, the effect of the big yen appreciation in late
1985 was to close the cost gap with most foreign producers. Then when these foreign
producers began to understand and apply lean production techniques as well, the
efficiency gap began to close too (Smitka 1993 and Fujimoto 1999). So while exports
have been an important source of demand for Japanese producers since the 1960s (Rapp
1972) and continue in auto parts as an area of trade negotiations with the U.S., Japanese
cars no longer are in short supply or sell at a premium in the U.S. market. Rather, a strong
or weak Yen relative to the dollar affects prices for Japanese produced cars both overseas
and in Japan. In addition, with over 50% of sales being tied to foreign markets (Tables 1,
8 & 10), events external to Japan such as the U.S. stock market boom or the Asian
financial crisis can affect Japanese producers’ business results, such as Toyota’s, both
positively and negatively. So, more than ever before, international circumstances and
exchange rates impact profitability and the demand for Japanese brand vehicles in
domestic and overseas markets (Matsushima 1998).
This competitive situation raises several important strategic issues once one
recognizes that the global market for automobiles is not static. That is, there are several
important trends occurring within the industry that are inter-linked. First, unit growth in
automobile demand is no longer in the advanced countries but in developing ones
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(MacKnight 1997). However, in the advanced countries, including Japan, there has been
a dramatic demand shift from sedans to recreational vehicles (RVs), so that the growth in
demand for new RVs has been quite strong.8 At the same time Japan, several European
countries and states such as California, which is the fifth largest car market in the world
(Sealy 1991), have introduced increasingly stringent environmental and mileage
standards (Brogan 1997a). These affect the ability of producers to meet these standards
and still respond to the increased demand for RVs that tend to be less fuel-efficient. This
is because these standards are frequently on a fleet-sold basis. Therefore, automobile
companies need to have more cars with better mileage and emission performance in order
to sell many of their high-margin RVs. In addition, it is likely that many developing
countries such as China that are already facing serious pollution issues will need to
implement similar regulations in the future.
In combination with their economic situation, this strategic landscape has several
important implications for Japanese producers. One, it indicates there is excess capacity
in Japan of three to four million cars that will not be used in the foreseeable future for
meeting either domestic or export demand (Keller 1997, MacKnight 1997 and Appendix
II). Therefore, plant closings are inevitable, and Nissan has already announced some. In
addition, to fully use the remaining capacity, firms will need to shift production both
towards RVs and environmentally sensitive vehicles. This has already happened to a
large degree in RVs (Matsushima 1998), but only Toyota and Honda have made
significant strides with respect to the latter. Furthermore, since several other advanced
                                         
8 This demand shift has benefited TMC because Toyota is able to use the same parts for regular cars and RVs, but RV
prices and margins are higher. So the fact that this market has grown is good from a business viewpoint. Also Toyota
can still benefit from its scale and low cost parts supplies.
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countries have excess supply plus what is being added in developing countries (Keller
1997 and MacKnight 1997), Japanese FDI in automobiles will need to be efficient. They
will also need to produce vehicles that are responsive to demand in terms of size, price,
fuel economy, local conditions and the environment.9 Recently, the biggest and fastest
growing vehicle market has been Asia, and with about an 80% market share, the Japanese
currently dominate it since they saw its potential very early (MacKnight 1997). They
were also pushed in this direction by the combination of Japan’s recession and the strong
yen. However, this size and growth is inviting strong challenges from the new global auto
groupings (Keller 1997 and MacKnight 1997). This is quite logical since the potential
here is very great when one recognizes that in the U.S. there is one vehicle for every
licensed driver, but in the developing countries it might be one for every ten or twenty. In
addition, just India and China have populations exceeding 1 billion. This is why the
major global groupings are pushing into Asia.
The global groups have been aided in this belated initiative by several fortuitous
developments. One, the Asian financial crisis has forced three major Korean producers,
Hyundai/Kia, Daewoo and Samsung, to restructure, including possible foreign
ownership.  The Asian crisis plus Japan’s continued recession has forced the weaker
Japanese automobile producers including Nissan, Mitsubishi and Mazda into progressive
rationalizations and periodic losses (Appendix II). Since Toyota and Honda, as explained
above, have been able to take advantage of this situation given their greater financial
resources and lower production costs, the weaker Japanese firms have been pushed into
the arms of the global groups. Mitsubishi has joined Daimler-Chrysler; Mazda has
                                         
9 Keller (1997) notes global excess capacity could be as much as 15 to 20 million vehicles per year. In Japan, such
excess capacity and a weak Japanese economy has caused several firms to close plants such as Nissan’s Zama plant.
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strengthened its ownership ties with Ford; and Renault has acquired Nissan. In addition,
Nissan has had to sell its interest in Fuji Heavy (Subaru) to GM, which now has a 20%
stake in that firm and effective control in addition to its positions in Isuzu and Suzuki.
Thus, except for Toyota and Honda, Japan’s remaining car producers have now clearly
joined the U.S. and European dominated global groups and will be dependent on them to
meet the various cost, model and environmental issues facing the global industry.
Since these other Japanese producers are under cost, demand, and revenue
pressures and have limited resources for new models and R&D (Appendix II), they will
depend on participation in the global groups for new technologies, new models and an
expanded market network. At the same time, their sharing in the allocation of resources
and demand will be driven by each group’s global strategy and sourcing decisions that
will depend on demand for certain vehicles and exchange rates. Given these conditions, it
will be very difficult for these Japanese producers to fully anticipate either prices or
demand. Furthermore international pressures will be exacerbated by Japan’s continued
economic weakness that limits demand generally and puts pressure on all producers to fill
capacity while further rationalizing production.
While the weakening of such Japanese competitors would seem to be beneficial to
Toyota, this combination of events has not left TMC unaffected. Its domestic auto
revenues and profitability have declined during the 1990s as these competitors
rationalized production and lowered prices to generate sales even at a loss (Appendix II).
In addition, now that these competitors have joined one of the major global groups, their
continued competitive existence in some form is assured, since they will have greater
access to new model designs and technical resources. They will also be able to contribute
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to their groups’ competitive capabilities in foreign markets where Toyota also competes
and sees its future market growth.10 This is an important consideration when one
recognizes that certain of these Japanese competitors are strong in selected product-
market segments, such as Mitsubishi in RVs. With proper group support, this strength can
increase global competitive pressures on Toyota. For example, not only in the U.S. but
also in Japan, RVs, including vans, SUVs (sport-utility-vehicles), and station wagons,
have become very popular, going from 14.4% of the Japanese market in 1991 to 40.8% in
1997 and 51% in 1998 (Matsushima 1998). This demand shift particularly affected
Honda and Mazda whose RV sales went from 0% and 10% of Japanese sales respectively
to 63.5 % and 70.3%, while Mitsubishi who has always produced lightweight trucks, saw
RVs go from 32.3% to 62.8% of sales. On the other hand, while Toyota’s RV sales grew
too from 11% to 35.3%, it was not as marked as for its competitors, reflecting its
improved position in traditional cars. But even here import competition has increased,
rising from less than 1% before 1985 to over 6% of the total car market by 1996 and over
30% in the very profitable large car segment. So even the Japanese market has now
become subject to global competitive forces.
Furthermore, TMC’s overseas sales and production grew substantially during the
1990s (Appendix II). Indeed, sales growth is now mostly overseas and Toyota expects
that eventually global sales will be over 65% of revenues, compared to 48% in 1994
(Matsushima). Therefore competition will be global in all markets against large global
                                         
10 Asian growth is especially key for TMC. “Top Toyota executives see Asian markets-where the world’s number-three
automotive producer sold 433,000 vehicles in 1995 versus nearly 1.1 million in the United States and almost 2.1
million at home-as key to the success of plans to boost global sales to 6 million units a year early in the next decade
from an estimated 4.7 million now. Much larger sales in China and India are central to Toyota’s Asian strategy,”
(MacKnight 1997). This is one reason why TMC recently increased its ownership in Daihatsu to over 50% given the
latter’s strength in the Chinese market.
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competitors. So Toyota must continue to meet certain primary strategic objectives in
order to manage these challenges of global expansion, shifting demand and stronger
competitors. First, it must continue as the global low-cost producer; second, it must
expand further into emerging markets (footnote 10); and third, it must develop and
produce new cars and technologies that meet its vision of the future. Further, it must
accomplish this as its own independent global group. Rationalizing its operations as its
Japanese competitors other than Honda have done is not a logical approach to addressing
these considerations. Rather, the strategy it has developed seeks to build on existing
strengths to produce more efficiently a wider model range responsive to existing or
emerging demands. A strategic problem for Toyota in implementing this approach,
though, is how to substantially differentiate its product and services, including new ones,
from those of its competitors, even if it continues to be the world’s most efficient and
lowest cost producer domestically and overseas.11
This is because, as explained above, all its competitors were able to effectively
follow the demand shift to RVs. Even Honda, which primarily had produced sedans, was
able to extend its line into small sports cars, sport utility vehicles, and vans. So with the
support of the larger global groups, Toyota’s competitors should be able to make similar
future shifts, including possible increases in value added through new features or
technologies. Acquisitions and affiliations have also been easily emulated. Indeed almost
all large Japanese auto producers have been able to find similar solutions given the same
business and economic environment in terms of geographic or product diversification
                                         
11 Toyota wants its Japanese production to be about 13,000 units per day. This is because if production drops below
12,000, TMC would have to go under an 8-hour day. But this level is affected by the exchange rate. Every 10 yen
change impacts profits by 1 billion yen. Thus, despite changes in the market, if the yen went to 130 from 140, for
example, profits would fall. However, as TMC is the strongest Japanese producer globally in costs, profits, technology,
management, and economics, such a yen change would make them stronger relative to Japanese competitors.
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possibilities, global affiliation and cost reduction initiatives. This is why TMC has
recognized for some time that another strategic approach is required to address the
changing nature of the industry, the increase in global group-based competition and
periodic excess capacity. And it must be one that is not easily emulated by competitors,
even the more formidable competition that will emerge from the well-financed and well-
staffed mega-groupings with their recently expanded Japanese ties.
Without such a strategy the firm’s major business and the company could
continue to be adversely impacted by events largely outside its control such as exchange
rate fluctuations, global economic developments and industry consolidation. On the other
hand if Toyota can succeed in its objective of efficiently selling to existing and new
customers a wider range of specialized or even unique products and services that cannot
be easily copied, then sales and earnings should increase, while global market share will
expand. This is the key strategic issue TMC has been facing. The solution has been to
develop a smart-design, smart-production and smart-product strategy that can efficiently
offer customers an expanded range of customized products and services in ways that
cannot be easily copied or adopted by competitors. A key element within this strategy
involves the use of both organizational and embedded information technologies.
Toyota’s Multi-faceted Global Strategy
To meet a globally diverse market and competitive challenge TMC has developed
an equally diverse and global strategic response. While there are many elements to this,
two aspects stand out as particularly important. One is the use of IT to enhance Toyota’s
lean production and lean design strategy so that it evolves into a smart production and
design strategy. The other is to design and develop vehicles that are also smart. In this
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way they are responding to Mr. Okuda’s vision of the future evolution of the global
automobile industry (Okuda 1998), where he states in “When the Ground Rules Change”:
“I now have discussed three watersheds in the history of the automobile industry. Each
time, a new business model changed the ground rules for the industry. Each time the new
model seemed invincible. And each time, it gave way to changing circumstances and a
new business model. ... Our old business model is breaking down for four main reasons.
One, we need to decentralize our manufacturing and R&D activities ... Two, the product
and process paradigms that Henry Ford established are themselves breaking down ...
Three, information technology is transforming the inner workings of the automobile. It is
also transforming the way we develop and make and sell our products. And four, the
changing product paradigm and the growing role of information technology will open our
industry to a vast array of competitors.”  One aspect of this perspective bears on the way
TMC produces its products since this influences both product design and competitiveness
and has been central to Toyota’s development as the world’s low cost producer. A second
impacts the products and services TMC will be selling in the future.
Smart Production
While seemingly contradictory due to its impact on prices and profits (Appendix
II), one benefit for Toyota of Japan’s rapid economic expansion during the late 1980s
was that many Japanese auto producers added capacity. This is because most of this
expanded capacity during the Bubble period went into highly automated plants that
turned out to be economically inefficient due to high capital and maintenance costs
combined with excessive downtime due to complex production processes (Fujimoto
1999). Toyota, on the other hand, while experimenting with sophisticated automation off-
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line, avoided a large commitment to this approach by sticking to its basic philosophy of
keeping it simple and using the “human element” and its “capabilities”, as quoted from
the company’s manual at the beginning of the previous section.
As Fujimoto (1999) explains: “when automation technologies are adopted, the
Toyota-style factories tend to take a conservative stance, both economically and
technologically. For example, these plants have tended to authorize only low-cost robots
whose unit investment cost can be repaid back in one or two years (i.e., equivalent of a
year’s labor cost). Technologically, they tend to choose simpler equipment that has ‘just
enough’ functions, rely on mechanistic automation rather than sophisticated numerical
control whenever the latter does not seem to be reliable enough, and use semi-automation
rather than full automation methods whenever the former seems to be cost-effective.”
Thus, the emphasis here for Toyota as in other areas, including using IT, is on total cost
effectiveness and reliability, while avoiding using technology for its own sake. This
policy has in turn improved relative profitability and return on investment.
In addition, it was this orientation that led Toyota to develop its multi-faceted
strategy that incorporates a smart multi-path design and produce strategy together with
the strategic use of IT to enhance both organizational and product performance. To
differentiate this approach from TMC’s traditional lean production strategy, this case will
refer to it as TMC’s smart design, smart production and smart car strategy, or just
“smart” strategy. The first part of this new smart strategy, i.e. smart design and
production, is described by Fujimoto (1999) in some detail and so will only be
summarized here. However, IT’s role in supporting this new approach will be described
more fully, both because it is the focus of this case, and because Fujimoto touches on it
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very briefly. The second part of TMC’s new approach, or smart product strategy, while
explaining the growing role of embedded software and electronics in automobiles
generally, will emphasize its role in implementing TMC’s twin initiatives in
environmentally sensitive vehicles and intelligent transportation systems (ITS)
respectively. Toyota believes this dual approach that emphasizes both organization and
product will meet its strategic requirements including that competitors will find it
difficult to emulate.
We know from Womack, Jones and Roos (1990) and other researchers that TMC
had already developed a comprehensive lean production system by the early 1970s. As
other Japanese producers such as Mazda and Mitsubishi emulated it, the whole Japanese
industry began to achieve similar productivity improvements. Indeed, as already
explained above, the Japanese industry had a huge productivity and cost advantage by the
early 1980s, which was only eliminated in the early 1990s by a large yen appreciation
and the U.S. industry’s strong productivity improvements (Fujimoto 1999 and Smitka
1993). By this time, though, TMC had almost 30 years of experience with lean
production compared to perhaps five to ten for Western firms. Further, lean concepts
were totally integrated into TMC’s organization and strategic thinking. Therefore, as
Toyota began to feel the competitive pressures discussed above and the need for a new
approach, it was in the best position to assess the strengths and weaknesses of its own
production system. In making this assessment, Toyota shows its tremendous ability to
learn and think in an evolutionary manner (Fujimoto 1999).
In its simplest terms TMC recognized that despite its production efficiency due to
just in time delivery, its lean production line was still a line. There were also limits to the
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benefits of assembling larger “black-box” units delivered from suppliers (Fujimoto
1999). Operations in both cases had to be done sequentially rather than in parallel.
Secondly, there were certain steps in the assembly process where TMC had improved
productivity to a point where further improvements were marginal. These limited the
speed at which the entire line could improve. Thirdly, the labor force was aging, and,
despite the recession, in the long-term there was likely to be a shortage of assembly
workers leading to more older workers, part-timers or returnees, such as women, working
in its plants. This thought process led to a complete rethinking of the assembly line. The
new process was initiated in a new plant in Kyushu in 1992, and then migrated to Toyota
City in 1995 to produce the small RAV4 SUV (Economist March 1995). Success there
led to a revamping of the plant in Georgetown, Kentucky in 1999 as well as the
Motomachi plant in Toyota City that the case writer visited in November of 1999.
Fujimoto (1999) explains the dramatic productivity improvements of this new
smart production system as due to the “ the autonomous complete assembly line
concept.”  Under this concept the line is broken into 5 to 12 segments with buffer stocks
to manage the differences in timing between completing various assembly functions.
Therefore one already sees important differences in this approach from the lean
production system where the producer tries to have everything operate continuously and
where in-process inventories are kept to a minimum (Womack et al 1990 and Fujimoto
1999). Further, whereas previously assembly tasks might be unrelated but were driven by
the timing or sequencing of assembly tasks, now related tasks are assigned by segment.
As described by Fujimoto (1999) and seen by the author on previous visits, “the final
assembly process at Toyota’s conventional factories of the 1980s … can be characterized
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as follows: Toyota’s volume factories adopted the Ford-style moving assembly lines …;
there is nothing unique in the body transfer mechanisms and basic layouts of Toyota’s
conventional assembly lines. … The conveyer lines tended to be separated into three line
segments: trim, chassis, and final. Different conveyer systems tended to be used among
them. However, no buffer body was allowed between the line segments, so the assembly
process was operated as if there had been one long and continuous line.”
The new system, however, while retaining many elements of the old (such as just
in time parts delivery) is substantively different. “A group of functionally related
assembly tasks (e.g. piping) are assigned to one segment. Toyota defined 108
subcategories of assembly tasks and changed the task assignments so that each
subcategory was completed within a group of workers. … A quality check is located at
the end of each line segment. … Each line segment corresponds to a group (kumi) f
about twenty workers, within which job rotation and training are conducted. The function
and responsibility of group leaders are strengthened. Each group leader, now in charge of
a semi-independent line segment, enjoys more discretion in managing the group’s
operations. For example, each segment can fine-tune its line speed within a certain limit.
Other supporting equipment for line control (line speed controllers, switches for planned
line stops), information sharing (monitoring, displays and on boards) and self-
actualization … is set up for each line segment.”  In addition, “the automation zone and
the manual assembly zone coexist on the same assembly line,” and “a group of assembly
workers on the line, rather than off-line maintenance staff, are in charge of operating the
equipment.” Such integration of human and machine elements together with worker
responsibility for improving performance is of course a Toyota core competency. So the
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end result was “generally consistent with what the process engineers had aimed for: …
As each set of assembly jobs assigned to a work group became more meaningful and
easier to understand, and since each group could self-inspect quality more effectively, the
productivity and quality of the autonomous complete line was generally higher than the
conventional assembly line, particularly during the start-up period.”
Such improvement was measurable. “The lead time for mastering a job was
shortened to about a half. According to a survey of Toyota Kyushu assembly workers,
over 70 percent of the respondents said they became more quality conscious and that their
jobs became easier to understand, compared to the previous assembly lines. Also,
because the body buffer areas absorbed the impact of line stops at other segments, overall
down-time decreased.” In this way the system helped workers focus and avoid being
“swamped by the complexity and confusion of the line, partly owing to the unrelatedness
of tasks assigned to them.” So Toyota’s new system achieved its objectives of substantial
improvements in quality and productivity while making it easier to use and absorb a more
diverse work force. What is not stated in Fujimoto’s excellent description and analysis,
though, is the complex IT system that lies behind this “simpler” more productive
assembly process.
For example, for buffer stocks not to become excess in-process inventory but to
just manage the assembly flow from one segment to another in order to decrease
assembly time, each segment must know in real time what the line speed and buffer stock
levels are at each other segment. In addition, the overall layout is represented by three
large “U”s.  One U is composed of line segments assembling the body. A second U
consists of those assembling the chassis; and a third has segments completing the engines
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and transmissions that have arrived almost ready to install from the engine factory. The
third U’s biggest task is to put the engine and transmission together. The completed
engines with transmission are mounted on the chassis in-line and the U with completed
chassis, engine and transmission then intersects with a completed body coming from
another U-shaped set of segments dedicated to body assembly. The car then continues
down the assembly line to receive the parts that are needed to complete the process.
Because several operations are now done in parallel, in-process inventories
despite the buffer stocks are substantially reduced compared to the process beginning
with the chassis and having the parts, including the body, added in sequence. At the same
time, making sure that the right chassis, engine, and body come together for a given order
requires sophisticated and complex real time data management. This might not have
presented great difficulties for the first Henry Ford since all Model T’s were the same and
all were black. However, for Toyota every car is unique in terms of color, equipment,
engine configuration, etc., etc. Thus the precise chassis with the particular engine to go
with a certain color and style body must all come together at the precise point that the U’s
converge. Furthermore, they must do this while allowing for the fact that the different
segments may be operating at different line speeds so that particular modules may
entering or leaving the buffer stocks at different times. This is why the new production
system is “smart”.
Furthermore, under the old “just in time” system, parts were delivered to the
assembly lines according to the production schedule sent to first-tier parts suppliers. This
process is well documented in Womack et al (1990) as well as Fujimoto (1999) and
Ahmadjian (1997a) among others. Recently this communication has moved from data
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transfer by computer to a real time on-line system in which the parts suppliers participate.
That is, the parts suppliers are now directly connected to Toyota’s production information
system so that they can automatically access the information they need for just in time
parts delivery, rather than receiving a delivery schedule on a batch basis based on
planned production. Effectively they know where each car is in the production process at
any point in time, though the production schedule usually becomes set about four days
ahead of actual production (Fujimoto 1999).12 This real time system allows the suppliers
greater flexibility in planning their own production, and enables them to respond to
changes that occur in real time.
Further, logistical instructions are now included in this data because the industry’s
(and particularly Toyota’s) success has led to increased scale and traffic congestion near
its plants, as suppliers try to deliver parts at the same time to the same factory. Indeed,
Smitka (1993) notes that by the early 1990s parts inventories on trucks were Toyota’s
largest inventory item. To solve this situation Toyota developed a sophisticated logistical
and traffic-control system that is now coupled with its on-line just in time parts delivery
system, so that delivery routes and times are part of the demand pull ordering system. In
this way, Toyota is using IT to control every aspect of its production system while
enhancing and further institutionalizing the benefits of its existing supplier network.
                                         
12 TMC itself explains (Toyota 1993 & 1999): “auto manufacture involves bringing together tens of thousands of parts.
And we have now introduced assembly line control (ALC) to control this complicated process. Computers and Robots
are utilized in each production line, bringing quality to the automaking process at the system level.” But apparently this
attention to detail and organization has been part of Toyota’s culture from the beginning. In 1937 Toyoda Kiichiro
observed that “an automobile consists of thousands of parts, each one essential for building a flawless, complete
vehicle. It is no easy task to coordinate their assembly. Without perfect organization of the assembly process, even a
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These benefits include the willingness of suppliers to commit to firm-specific
investments including the IT investments needed to become part of TMC’s real time on-
line network. As Ahmadjian (1997) explains suppliers are willing to invest in firm-
specific assets such as a new or upgraded IT system. This is due to their feeling of
support by Toyota, which it has built over 30 years of business, plus equity ownership
that cements supplier ties and indicates TMC’s commitment. Importantly, this feeling and
inter-action also supports a similar willingness on the part of the supplier to invest in new
designs and the systems needed to improve cycle times.
Smart Design
Traditionally U.S. and European auto producers have designed vehicles based on
inputs from marketing and have then left it to production to manufacture that design
(Sealy 1991, Sobek 1997 and Fujimoto 1999). Once manufacturing developed a
prototype, it could then cost the final product and set the price. In the case of Toyota and
subsequently other Japanese manufacturers, however, the production engineering group
(PE) is intimately involved in the design process from the beginning. This is because
marketing initially establishes a target for a market segment in terms of both style and
price. Since roughly 80% of a vehicle’s costs are fixed in the first 20% of the design
process, it is very important that the product design can be manufactured and at the target
cost or lower. Furthermore, this approach is strategically sound because a great product
design wont sell if the product is not produced at a price that customers will pay (Sobek
1997). This led Toyota to develop an integrated concurrent engineering and design
organization, which has reduced design costs and sped new product and new model
                                                                                                                   
mountain of parts fails to become a single vehicle. For the task of coordinating the assembly of thousands of parts, we
must design a unique pattern of control and organization.” (Excerpted from Guiding Principles of Toyota.)
31
introductions. In addition, this approach logically recognizes the interconnections and
interactive impacts between the product and production. Product design will affect the
design of the production process, the equipment used, the cost of the product, reliability
of the process, and product quality (Sealy 1991, Sobek 1997 and Fujimoto 1999).13
Toyota’s PE (production engineering) group is a separate organization from
product engineering and seconds its representatives to be part of new model or product
design teams. They also have their own groups within each plant so they can assess how
a car will actually be produced, though Toyota has applied standard process procedures at
each plant so it is relatively easy to shift model production between plants (Sobek 1997
and Fujimoto 1999). Its project involvement has five major aspects covering design
standards, design reviews, prototype builds, receiving drawings and designing the
manufacturing process, including equipment. Early in the product design process, the PE
engineers transfer data on the latest production standards and capabilities including any
recent improvements due to kaizen. This is where close knowledge of what is happening
in each plant is critical. Then during design review, the PE representatives informally
suggest design changes or solutions that can improve product manufacturing. These
suggestions become more concrete as a model’s prototype is actually built. In addition,
TMC does not wait for the vehicle’s entire design to be competed before releasing
                                         
13 Sobek (1997) calls Toyota’s special approach to concurrent engineering “set-based concurrent engineering.” Sealy
calls its “design-for-manufacture” that integrates “the industrial design and engineering design process.” This reflects
analytic design technique that rearranges or modifies designs that are already known to achieve new goals or lower
costs, e.g. PE’s upwardly revised standards. One such goal for TMC is to efficiently produce personalized automobiles
to reflect individual customer needs (Sealy 1991). This can already be done using smart production techniques but it
also requires that the vehicle’s design allow for such flexibility in terms of options and various features. This is smart
design because the designer is solving customers’ problems. Because CAD systems facilitate such multiplicity, they are
integral to the smart design process, while telecommunications facilitates global dissemination to TMC’s overseas
production locations as well as local design features. Also, by speeding the process and shortening model life cycles
such systems help contain R&D costs for new models, while getting new technologies to the customer faster. At the
same time value engineering, value costing and target costing insure that the customer will pay for them. Finally, smart
design includes working closely with parts suppliers as they produce almost 70% of the vehicle’s value added
(Fujimoto 1999).
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drawings to the PE group and parts suppliers. Rather as they are finished, PE can start
developing the necessary materials and equipment, significantly speeding the design to
production cycle. Further, all observers agree that because PE is involved from the
beginning, design and manufacturing operate hand and glove, and that this is a key aspect
of Toyota being and remaining the industry benchmark for production in terms of quality
and efficiency. Also, since PE standardizes processes across the corporation (Sobek 1997
and Fujimoto 1999) and is constantly upgrading those standards, improvements in
productivity get translated across the corporation and positively affect the production of
all vehicles.
Furthermore, the design team knows that if a design conforms to the currently
published production process standards, it can be manufactured. This reduces the time
needed to engineer that part since production engineering for it does not have to be
repeated. Yet, because the standards indicate a range of possibilities, there is generally
sufficient flexibility for the design team to meet its goals. This allows the team to allocate
more engineering effort to those items that are really new or different. The newer the
product or design, such as the hybrid car, the more the PE engineers will be involved in
the design process to insure both production capability and cost efficiency. Because of
cooperation and teamwork and the fact the PE personnel are assigned to new models for
the life of the project, Toyota uses about half the personnel on a design team as the
typical U.S. firm (Sealy 1991).
Sophisticated IT is needed not only to support design through the advanced use of
CAD (Computer Aided Design)/CAM (Computer Aid Manufacturing) systems but is also
critical to the efficient communication of those designs among the project team and
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between TMC and its suppliers. Frequent design changes in developing a new product or
model only enhance this fact. This has become more critical as TMC has moved more
and more towards “bundled outsourcing.” This is a black box system where using
“approved drawings” “a parts supplier conducts detailed engineering of a component it
makes for an automobile maker on the basis of the latter’s specifications and basic
designs,” (Fujimoto 1999). IT greatly speeds and facilitates the interchange of the
engineering and other information between supplier and TMC with respect to the precise
component, while 3D displays permit TMC’s engineers to quickly evaluate the part
proposed within the context of the total vehicle. The black box approach thus extends
TMC’s own successful routine of integrating design with ease-of-manufacture to parts
design and manufacture. In turn TMC’s supplier management strategies give the
suppliers which already specialize in such parts manufacture a profit incentive to improve
quality and cost by using such an integrated “design & manufacture routine” (Fujimoto
1999). In this way TMC’s smart design and production strategy builds on its existing
supplier networks and is an extension of the lean production supply system they have
developed over the last 35 years.
IT and Management of Supplier Networks
In other words, the success of smart production and design must be seen not only
in the context of how TMC designs and produces vehicles but also in how it manages its
supplier relationships.14 This is because as Ahmadjian (1997) explains “suppliers in Japan
                                         
14 Womack et (1990), Ahmadjian (1997) and Fujimoto (1999) all describe in some detail the structure of TMC’s
supplier network and how it is managed to optimize the use of dedicated networks to capture the benefits of learning
and evolutionary learning. Rules and routines with in this organizational system abound and are partially
institutionalized via IT. Low transaction costs and low governance reduce overhead, while Toyota controls distribution
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have a strong incentive to continuously reduce costs. The written contract contains no
fixed prices; rather, twice a year, an automaker announces general price reduction targets
and then renegotiates prices with each parts maker individually. A supplier that is able to
reduce its cost significantly below the price without compromising quality can pocket the
difference-at least until the next round of price negotiations. If it cannot meet its target, a
supplier may lose preferred status or even be required to submit to reorganization.” For
this reason “auto parts tend to be highly customized to specific automakers and models,
and as a result, necessitate considerable investment in non-redeployable assets.
Investment in customer-specific sites is common-as seen in the concentration of
Toyota suppliers in Toyota City and its immediate environs. Japanese auto parts suppliers
also make considerable investments in specific human capital. Guest engineers,
dispatched by suppliers to an automaker’s facilities, learn everything from how it
manages the development process to the shorthand it uses for notes on its drawings.
Suppliers develop informal networks with an automaker’s managers and engineers, to
obtain information and get things done.” Also as Ahmadjian (1997) notes: “while U.S.
makers have begun to adopt the form of these practices- e.g. increased cooperation with
                                                                                                                   
of profits to achievers and reduces duplication. Thus it does not extract profits but builds incentives to improve via
cooperation and productivity as keys to success. Managing this network is a clear core competency of Toyota
(Ahmadjian 1997a) as seen in fact “ Toyota is significantly more profitable than its suppliers, and has twice the ROA of
the second most profitable automaker, Honda. Nissan, on the other hand, is not significantly more profitable than its
suppliers, while Isuzu is significantly less profitable.” Also, Honda does not have a formal supplier relationship group
and asserts more arms-length relationships with its suppliers (Ahmadjian 1997a). It would appear that Toyota is thus
the leader in exploiting network benefits, which it has now cemented through sharing and linking of IT systems in
addition to cross-shareholding and other interactions.  Further, the consistent high level of investment by suppliers in
customer specific assets is well established for Toyota (W, J&R 1990, Ahmadjian 1997a and Fujimoto 1999) and “are
key factors behind the high levels of quality, flexibility and cost competitiveness that have made the industry a
formidable global competitor.” This has “facilitated transfer of technology of customer to supplier, and promoted the
diffusion of such developments as the kanban system, statistical quality control, value engineering and value analysis,
and advances in human resource management. Highly specialized networks of suppliers who work closely with their
customers have allowed Japanese manufacturers to reduce development time and squeeze costs out of the system from
the earliest stages of product development through the manufacturing process.” However, with respect to IT, with the
exception of the logistics project and the replacement steel project, its role has been to improve and speed the excellent
existing communication and interchange of production data and engineering designs with suppliers rather than
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fewer suppliers-they have been much slower in adopting the substance, in particular, the
notion that an automaker has an obligation to protect its suppliers.”  Thus what IT has
done is to speed, facilitate and enhance already successful routines that existed for TMC
and its suppliers while helping them to meet the requirements of the new smart design
and production system. This is key to improving the twin goals of quality and efficiency
as such “cooperation between assemblers and their suppliers has allowed Japanese
automakers to drastically reduce new model development time, to endure endless rounds
of cost-cutting, and to respond quickly to changes in demand. By outsourcing a large
percentage of parts development and manufacture to independent, yet closely linked
suppliers, Japanese automakers have been able to exploit the incentive benefits of market
relationships while reaping the learning and coordination benefits of hierarchy.”
(Ahmadjian and Lincoln 1997)
Toyota has also built on the existing trust and commitment within its supplier
network to persuade suppliers to invest in new IT systems that directly impact costs and
productivity such as the logistical and navigation system that improves delivery times and
reduces in-truck inventories. A similar large joint IT development project is the auto
replacement parts and replacement steel project that TMC has initiated with Nippon Steel
(Rapp 2000). Under this program Toyota is working with NSC to develop a massive
database and complex analytical algorithm that will help predict the actual demand for
replacement parts based on factors such as where cars are located, the number being
driven, accident and repair records, shipping times, and commonalty. This analysis will
permit NSC to lower the steel inventories it maintains to satisfy such demand with the
                                                                                                                   
materially altering the relationships. Thus, its effect has g n rally been evolutionary rather than revolutionary as
compared to the new website proposed by U.S. producers.
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millions in cost savings to be shared between NSC and Toyota. Toyota is also
participating in NSC’s new e-commerce steel ordering system, which permits it to
efficiently track its steel supply on-line in real time (Rapp 2000).
These uses of IT to either enhance TMC’s existing organizational structures or to
directly reduce inventory costs are excellent examples of how TMC is actively using IT
to control and improve the organizational aspects of its business. Yet, it is taking a
cautionary approach to the new suppliers website proposed by the large U.S. auto
producers (Evans and Wurster 1999).15 A closer look at the proposed structure of this
                                         
15 As reported in The Japan Times, there are two separate types of websites for parts. One is for OE (original
equipment) and the other for replacement parts. Toyota has announced its own separate site based in California for
replacement parts, which will compete against GM’s TradeXchange and Ford’s Auto-Xchange. For OE parts, though,
Ford and GM have merged their sites, and Daimler-Chrysler has joined along with the Renault-Nissan group. However,
while TMC and Honda may join the exchange, “analysts expect their role to be limited to purchasing raw materials and
simple parts.” This is because while there “could be merits in raw materials procurement, … Toyota and Honda
develop many parts together with their suppliers and it’s hard to imagine they will go through the site to get these when
information might be exposed.” This is why Toyota with “its own Intranet system that links it with 1,250 parts
companies” will join only if “it guarantees the freedom in how Toyota uses the system and erects credible fire walls to
protect corporate secrets.” Indeed, the reporter correctly observes that officials at Toyota and Honda have questioned
the trend towards universally available common parts – a trend they see as taking the competition out of carmaking.”
Further, “suppliers could reduce costs during the first year … tempting assemblers to bulk-buy from only one supplier,
but the assembler could easily be at the mercy of price hikes … the next year.”
The large U.S. producers naturally have a different view. Their strategy and its potential impact is well described and
analyzed in Evans and Wurster (1999). They observe that “the Automotive Network Exchange, ANX, is the world’s
largest extranet, already involving over five thousand companies in the automotive supply chain worldwide. … ANX
will provide the industry with a nonproprietary, global communications network that is built on Internet technology. …
It supports communications across all participating companies, and also provides ‘virtual private networks’ for its
members, allowing employees within a company to communicate securely with one another. … Over time, ANX will
promulgate a series of standards for different kinds of transactions, which will then be mandated by the major OEMs.
… Production and logistics will become closely coupled across the entire supply chain. … Automated supplier-bidding
standards will enable contracts to be announced and bid among companies who hardly know each other. Teams will be
able to share applications on ANX servers so that engineers from different companies around the world can swap
computer-aided design and engineering files and see one another’s changes in real time during meetings. The most
obvious and immediate impact will be on costs. Currently, OEMs and their big, Tier One component suppliers use
proprietary networks to communicate with each other. … As these systems are replaced with a single open network,
communication costs will plummet … but also speed up communication and eliminate errors. Today a specification
change announced in Detroit takes about ninety days to be communicated along the entire supply chain, … ANX will
reduce that to a matter of minutes. Much more important, however, ANX will lower costs indirectly by intensifying
competition throughout the supply chain. The new standards will make it easy for buyers to post supply requirements
on electronic bulletin boards, manage a real time bidding process, and maximize comparability among their would-be
suppliers. … For many suppliers, … this means the intensification of what is already a very competitive marketplace.
… ANX will generate big opportunities for players with genuinely better mousetraps. … ANX opens the possibility of
leapfrogging the traditional supply chain hierarchy and enabling direct collaboration among players at noncontiguous
levels. ANX will also allow small suppliers to collaborate much more easily … to share resources, design products
together in real time… a sea change in managerial thinking … ANX provides the beginnings of an infrastructure that
allows the kind of rich, recombinant innovation that Silicon Valley is famous for, but enables it to flourish across
barriers of geography, industry, and corporate culture.” While the U.S. Big Three are clearly behind this, Toyota and
Honda remain justifiably skeptical based on their experience and successful routines. Only time will tell who is right.
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venture, however, indicates why. This is because expanding the range of potential
suppliers who can respond to a bid on an auto producer’s published standard would seem
to move in the opposite direction to TMC’s black box approach emphasizing larger
modules, simplified assembly, and more supplier interaction. No matter what
opportunities the car companies have built into the new website for suppliers to
participate in a greater degree of cooperation with the assemblers (including participation
in the design phase), under this system the risks for suppliers in committing to undertake
relationship-specific assets have actually increased.
For this reason it will be difficult for the U.S. producers to replicate on their
website the networking efficiencies of the Toyota system regardless of their ability to
have design-in as part of the bidding process. Suppliers will be reluctant to spend the
money to offer specialized engineering or customer specific investments when they know
that next year or the next model cycle they can be replaced. So while for Japanese
suppliers “it is safe to invest in relationship-specific assets,”  (Ahmadjian 1997), there is
nothing in the description of the new U.S. website that indicates it will be able to
overcome the risks felt by their suppliers in making such investments. The best the U.S.
buyers can hope for is a modification of a supplier’s existing products. On the other hand,
if to attract such a commitment, the assemblers sign an exclusive arrangement and are
dependent on this supplier for a product, they risk being exploited in subsequent rounds
so the supplier can be sure to realize a return on its investment (footnote 15). Indeed, it
owes this obligation to its shareholders. Therefore it is not clear that the reciprocal
commitment tradition is so easily replaced just by putting auto parts supply in an e-
commerce framework. Indeed, the success of the NSC e-commerce strategy works
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because it builds on such existing reciprocity as well as greater -- not lesser --
customization.
Therefore, if a black box strategy and the willingness to “make the investments in
relationship-specific assets” along with periodic price reviews remains a superior
sourcing strategy to assure continuous cost declines, improved productivity and better
quality, then this new U.S. website is strategically flawed. This is true even if it moves
the industry towards standardized parts used by several producers. Furthermore, the site
does not exclude Toyota, Honda or others from using it to the extent such standard parts
would be lower cost and offer no special quality or other enhancements to the completed
vehicle. So Toyota wins in both cases. It gets cheaper standardized parts when that is
strategically beneficial, and it can source proprietary high-quality, low-cost black box
parts when they add value. In fact, Toyota seems very good at this kind of mixing to get
the optimum combination in terms of cost and quality.
If the industry standard is fine, TMC will use it, but if its network suppliers can
offer something exclusive, which is better and cheaper, it will use that and that part will
never appear on the industry website, while it will enhance the final product. Therefore
U.S. producers are fooling themselves in thinking that by going high tech, they have used
IT to achieve lower costs and to better access parts improvements since there is nothing
specific in the website that will build the commitment and credibility that will get
suppliers to make model or firm-specific investments. If such investments remain a
necessary condition to get continuous productivity and quality gains, then this new
Internet sourcing approach is flawed. Indeed, to the extent this e-commerce website
greatly expands the scope of possible suppliers and aggressive bidding to fill capacity,
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some suppliers may actually see their risks as rising. This will make them even more
reluctant to commit to expensive engineering or other costly procurement strategies
where the returns and buyer commitment are very uncertain.
In some respects the initiative seems a step backwards, since it lends a high-tech
and “wave of the future” mantle to what has already been shown as an inferior parts-
sourcing strategy since it puts U.S. assemblers back in the annual low-cost bidding
environment. Since this was a past core competency for them and one to which they no
doubt would like to return, this development has perhaps been greeted with enthusiasm.
But several studies have indicated that this sourcing strategy is not competitive compared
to Toyota’s approach, including Womack et al (1990). Thus it would seem to again
demonstrate that one cannot make a good strategy just by converting it to high tech. An
IT initiative will only be successful if it is used to enhance a sound business strategy.
This is why Toyota has approached the invitation to join the site (ANX) with caution and
has indicated it will only participate to the extent that purchasing or moving to a
standardized part makes sense. For Toyota, the key to smart production and design
remains that “cooperation between automaker and supplier continues throughout the
manufacturing process, with a constant search for cost-reducing redesigns and
improvements through value analysis and value engineering,” (Sealy 1991).
Smart Marketing
TMC knows it needs to create new marketing methods that will be effective in an
“information’ society” such as developing and introducing sales information networks
and creating a new information-receiving system that utilizes multimedia (TMC 1999).
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This includes establishing new ways to increase sales through the Internet.16 In Japan this
would extend its computerized ordering system where customers can currently order a car
to their specifications with the expectation of three-week delivery (Fujimoto 1999).
Though Toyota’s goal is to be able to produce customer-specific cars in five days (Los
Angeles Times 12/12/99), the present system still significantly reduces the potential cost
of dealer inventories (financing and space), year-end sales, and customer rebates. At the
same time, customer satisfaction is increased because customers get the precise car they
want. In the showroom, the customer gets to model his or her car on a 3-D screen, and
once the selection is made, the order is entered directly into the computer controlling
TMC’s production system.17 In the U.S. this can be done remotely through TMC’s
website, Toyota.com, with the car priced for the customer, who is then referred to a local
dealer that has the particular car in stock. In this way, TMC is developing IT based
marketing systems responsive to local conditions. Also, it is a way for TMC to expand its
channels and sales to young people, a prime marketing target, since they more actively
use the Internet.
Responding to Demand Changes Through Smart Production & Design
However, using IT in this manner is only part of Toyota’s global marketing
strategy in which IT plays various supporting roles. For example, in the emerging
markets where Toyota sees much future growth, it has had to develop smaller simpler
                                         
16 Mr. Matsushima of Nikko Research noted that while TMC was not yet using the Internet to sell new cars in Japan
due to registration requirements, it was using it to sell used cars. This gave TMC experience it could expand later.
Another reason for this approach is that Toyota discovered that most people using the Internet are searching. Thus, a
used car is OK, but a new car involves more details and issues, so that a search-mode is not so appropriate.
17 Toyota (1993) explained this as follows: “Toyota cars are delivered to customers through our nationwide network of
310 dealers. All Toyota dealers in Japan are linked directly to Toyota via an online computer network. Through this
network, customer orders from anywhere in the country go straight to our production system in preparation for
delivery. Through our showrooms to improve communication with customers, new techno shops, and the expansion of
our overseas rental and leasing service network, we aim to further improve our marketing and service activities.”
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cars that are more in tune with these countries’ economic conditions.18 In addition, to
achieve some efficiency and scale Toyota has had to develop local sourcing techniques.
TMC’s solution in the Asean market has been especially creative, and, as MacKnight
explains, also complex. “The perennial top seller in the region with a market share
estimated around 21 percent, Toyota has factories in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines
and Thailand. In 1995 these plants, generally run in partnership with local interests,
                                         
18 Because Toyota does not produce mini-cars but has relied on its affiliate Daihatsu for this, their subcompact vehicle
(Corolla) is relatively expensive for the Asian market and not a good entry vehicle compared to Suzuki’s (GM Group)
and Honda’s mini-cars. This was particularly apparent in the important China market where Daihatsu had established a
joint venture. Thus, in 1995 TMC bought a controlling interest in Daihatsu as part of its long-term global strategy.
Similarly, because of the importance of trucks to these markets, it acquired Hino as well, though in both cases this
meant Toyota had to integrate them into TMC’s global IT system (MacKnight 1997 and Ahmadjian 1997).
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assembled just over 301,700 cars, light trucks and commercial vehicles. Close to half of
this output came from the firm’s Thai businesses. By Toyota’s reckoning almost two-
thirds of its Asean-produced vehicles have a local content of at least 40 percent. Counting
towards this total are products purchased from the expanding OE parts industries of the
four countries in which it builds. Higher-value parts often are sourced from the plants set
up in the area by such big, traditional Toyota suppliers as Denso Corp. Still others come
from the company’s own parts factories in Asean.
Toyota makes gasoline engine blocks in Indonesia, power steering gears in
Malaysia, transmission parts in the Philippines, and diesel engine parts and body
stampings in Thailand. Under the Brand-to-Brand Complementation plan initiated in
1988 by the governments of those four countries and the replacement Asean Industrial
Cooperation Program now being phased in, Toyota can ship parts among the participating
economies at preferential tariff rates. This flexibility … promotes economies of scale and,
in turn, cost containment. Equally important, the BBC and AICO schemes count parts so
traded as locally made for the domestic content calculations of the relevant government,”
(MacKnight 1997.) However, to manage this complex arrangement as well as to compute
the optimal sourcing strategy based on tariffs, fees and local regulations requires
significant IT support. In addition, the ability to design and produce new models in 24
months or less gives Toyota the ability to respond quickly to changes in demand whether
in the advanced countries, such as the switch to RVs, or in the emerging markets.
Smart Cars
This ability to rapidly develop, design and produce new cars for different markets
has been key to TMC’s “smart” strategy. Perhaps nowhere has this been more apparent
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than in the rapid merging within the automobile of software, mechanics and electronics.19
Therefore, while IT has played an important role in enhancing Toyota’s organizational
efficiency to design, produce and sell vehicles, it is also starting to play a more direct and
somewhat different role in helping TMC meet its future strategic goals through its impact
on the vehicle itself. This is due to the increased use of electronics and software in
automobiles. Car stereos, car phones, car faxes, navigation systems, car TVs, electronic
fuel injection, climate control, cruise control, automatic transmissions, air bags, anti-lock
brakes, computerized engine management, smart restraint systems, keyless entry, etc. all
confirm this important trend (Cogan 1995).20
Many such automotive electronic products have been developed in Japan, location
of the world's dominant consumer electronics firms. So logically Japanese car
manufacturers have been leaders in introducing these features. Indeed, the close
relationship between these two sectors and the worldwide presence of Japanese
electronics firms has given Toyota another important element in its global strategy. As
Ahmadjian and Lincoln (1997) explain “one of the most important developments in
automotive technology has been the increased importance of electronics. ‘Car
electronics” … includes not only electronically controlled mechanical systems such as
electronic fuel injection and electronic power steering but also a new category of add-ons,
                                         
19 In the 1980s, the Japanese coined the word mechatronics to explain the merging of electronics and mechanical
devices in many of their products. In areas like automatic focusing and sophisticated computer peripherals such as
printers and camcorders, they have now added sophisticated software embedded in the product that controls the
electronics and the mechanics. This merging of software, electronics and mechanics into something that might be
termed “sometronics” will be an important aspect of Japanese industry’s competitiveness in the 21st Century.
20 Mr. Matsushima at Nikko Research also believes that electronically controlling the car is a key to the industry’s
future. This is clear in the case of ITS but it is also true for the hybrid car. He explained this is why TMC took over
development of its own chips and built its own factories to produce the required chips. In addition, he noted that TMC
has observed that the technology is advancing every month and that being directly involved is the only way to keep
pace and make sure new designs incorporate the latest electronics and IT. Indeed, Matsushima sees this development as
really favoring Toyota, especially as the development of the hybrid car’s engine control system is the critical
component and this requires very sophisticated embedded software. Indeed, because TMC is so far ahead in this regard,
he believes that selling this engine may become a source of profits for TMC further promoting its lead in this area.
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including navigation systems and even karaoke players. Electronic components are an
increasingly important percentage of an automobile’s value-added – particularly top-of-
the-line models. Perhaps even more important is that new generations of navigation and
other electronic control systems represent the future in a maturing industry. Navigation
systems have attracted particular interest. These systems have been described as the
‘brains’ of the automobile, and there is a perception in the industry that what for now is a
clever gadget in high-priced cars will be essential in differentiating between models in
the future.” (Ahmadjian and Lincoln 1997)
Indeed, TMC clearly recognized that electronics was becoming a critical aspect of
automobile design that any lack competence in this area could evolve into “a competence
destroying innovation for automakers,” (A&L 1997). In addition, developing the
embedded software needed to instruct many of these devices required understanding
vehicle mechanics and the whole car. These were competencies only the assemblers
possessed and not the electronics producers. So strategically it became important for
TMC to take this competency in-house rather than to rely completely on suppliers for
black box parts that would include any required electronics and embedded software.
Toyota’s management also recognized that they needed more expertise in the
parent company, and they would need to increase their affiliations with major consumer
electronics producers. This led to several actions. First, they loosened their dependence
on Nippon Denso for electronic components (A&L 1997). Second, TMC built its own
electronic-related parts factory at Hirose in 1989 with electrical engineering capability
covering electronic parts, antilock brakes, navigation systems and ICs. Third, Toyota
actively recruited electrical engineers, even mid-career, further emphasizing the
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important strategic nature of its move into electronics and embedded software. Fourth, it
announced in 1996 the formation of a joint venture with Texas Instruments to
manufacture semiconductors via its affiliate Toyoda Loom. And fifth, it built an
additional electronics parts factory in Miyagi in 1998.
This major strategic initiative into electronics and embedded software is another
illustration of Toyota’s capacity for evolutionary learning, as described by Fujimoto
(1999) and is an important element in its development of the new smart production and
design systems. It also illustrates its multi-faceted and multi-path approach to strategy
and the complexities of the global auto market. TMC’s vision of what is required for
competitive success is not limited to smart production and design coupled with a well-
manage supplier network and computerized marketing. Rather, it recognizes that success
in utilizing these strengths still depends on good technologically advanced products for
sale. Furthermore, such products must respond to changes in consumer tastes and needs
in the 21st Century.
This strategic demand requirement is partly met by Toyota’s aggressive
introduction of new cars by collapsing the design to production cycle through smart
design and congruent engineering. Even during the 1997-98 Japanese recession, Toyota
was able to announce the introduction of 15 new models globally, more than any other
producer (Brogan 1997a). Shortening cycle times in turn reduces forecasting errors while
allowing one to rectify mistakes more quickly (Fujimoto 1999). As Matsushima (1998)
notes, in 1996 TMC recognized that responding quickly to market changes would be
necessary to “survive and be a winner”, given new “intense global competition”. Indeed,
Toyota’s management definitely saw this as a “change in substance of competition.”
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Previously “being competitive … meant beating rival’s production in terms of quality and
price.” While still important competitive issues, “establishing an industrial ‘de facto
standard’ is” now emerging as “the key.”21 Combined with this development is that the
diversification of customer needs is shortening the product life cycle for automobiles,
putting a premium on “being able to create new products faster than competitors. So that
creativity and speed will be the most important factors to stay ahead of competitors.”
This is the strategic vision and basis for creating smart design and production and in turn
the smart products that are all part of the Vision 2005 TMC announced in 1996.22
IT has played an evolutionary strategic role in this regard through its contribution
to smart design, smart production and improved black box parts supply capability.
Suppliers use IT to participate in the design phase and supply those parts on a just-in-time
basis benefiting from on-line information and a cooperative environment where Toyota
suppliers have done well. Further, this has generally extended overseas through parts
suppliers’ FDI. On top of this, computerized ordering has tied marketing into this
organizational process and its computerized links. In this way, IT has enhanced and
institutionalized many aspects of Toyota’s evolving production system. However, IT also
plays a critical role in the smart car component of Toyota’s total strategy.
                                         
21 Evans and Wurster (1999) also observe “Once a standard achieves critical mass, the interconnectedness of all
physically defined industries ensures that it will inexorably spread to fill the entire domain in which it is competitively
advantaged.”
22 Some specialized subsidiaries have been created to support this strategy. Toyota MACs develops, manufactures and
services specialized measurement-control systems and equipment. Nippon Idou Tsushin Corp handles car telephones.
Toyota Digital Cruise is a registered type II VAN (Valued Added Telecommunications Network). Toyota System
Research develops and sells computer systems related to the development and manufacture of automobiles. Toyota Soft
Engineering develops and sells auto development related computer systems, especially CAD/CAM. Toyota System
International develops and sells business administration software. Toyota Caelum develops, sells and services
CAD/CAM software and hardware. Satellite Positioning Information Services provides navigation related information,
which will be an important element in developing ITS.
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While market changes in the advanced countries are leading to more electronics
and embedded software in every automobile along with rapid changes in those elements,
these can and have been emulated by competitors even if with a lag.23 In addition, some
electronics are dealer installed options supplied by consumer electronics companies. Thus
Toyota must run very hard to stay ahead. It is for this reason that another aspect of its
strategy has focused on smart car technologies that are not easily copied. These efforts
have focused on the environment and on intelligent transportation systems (ITS) as
important strategic trends that can give Toyota a longer-term advantage. The idea is to
reverse the current situation where cars are just commodities and everyone has similar
models or ones that can be quickly copied and introduced, especially as American firms
have closed the quality gap (Keller 1997) and remain close on the productivity gap.
Environmentally Smart Cars
Developing environmentally smart cars has been part of a three-year strategy
begun in 1996, related to the environment, cars, and IT (Matsushima 1998). This concept
appears to be quite sound since the environmentally sensitive hybrid cars introduced in
1997 initially sold out at 2000 per month, and though not yet profitable, they soon will
be. But in addition to their popular appeal, TMC has also recognized that in the advanced
countries, environmental regulations for vehicles are getting increasingly stringent.
California, which is the world 5th argest car market and is often copied by other
states, “currently plans to reduce auto emissions through a plan that divides autos into
four emission level groups, including ultra-low emission vehicles (ULEVs)” (Brogan
                                         
23 In January 2000, Ford announced its “Internet on Wheels” concept car (24-7 vehicles) to meet the new competition
that “involves computer chips, electronic sensors, Internet access and other wireless communications, and the ability to
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1997a). Even in emerging markets where policymakers see the auto and auto-parts
industries as revenue-enhancers, demand will be impacted by the fact that “in places like
China and Thailand, … big cities already are plagued by the problems of pollution from
tailpipe emissions and traffic congestion.”  So “vehicle taxes and fees intentionally or
otherwise do double-duty as regulatory tools,” (MacKnight 1997). This global market
reality is thus the source of TMC’s “strategic activity to gain publicity and reputation as
the No. 1 company for environmental protection,” which it has implemented already in
its new Prius hybrid car. This car, which can get up to 80 miles a gallon and has less than
half the pollution of a normal car, is currently being sold 4-5 years ahead of U.S.
producers. Only Honda has a competitive model. Further, “Toyota is confident that its
hybrid could qualify as a ULEV” (Brogan 1997a). This would permit TMC to substitute
the hybrid for a certain number of mandated electric cars, which are more expensive, and
still meet its fleet mileage and emission targets.24
The reason the hybrid car is difficult to emulate is because it requires
sophisticated embedded software to use both an electric motor and a small gasoline
engine as its power source. Controlling the interplay between these two motors under
different driving conditions is a complex task requiring equally complicated control
systems. This system is called THS or Toyota Hybrid System, and it manages such tasks
as how and when to recharge the battery powering the system, managing the switch
between a parallel and series based system to achieve both optimal power as well as the
best fuel/engine/motor efficiency. “THS calculates the desired operating condition and
                                                                                                                   
exploit those devices and systems to sell more than cars and trucks” (The Japan Times 1/2/00)
24 TMC is also experimenting with compact electric vehicles and direct injection engines, but only the hybrid is
assessed here since it is currently produced and sold (TMC 1997). Ford and GM recently announced the U.S. version,
which required a $350 million government subsidy to develop with no production before 2003.
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the current condition of the engine, motor, generator, battery, and other components, and
controls them accurately in real time.” It also uses an “intelligent power module to
increase reliability.” All this is not so easy to do or emulate as indicated by the fact that
Ford and GM have just announced their versions will be ready after 2003 and $350
million in U.S. government funding. Meanwhile Toyota will start selling its car in the
U.S. in August 2000. Given TMC’s two year design and production cycle combined with
its target costing, this means Toyota globally will be in its third generation model with
the associated technology upgrades and cost improvements due to learning and scale
effects before the Americans sell their first mass-produced hybrid vehicle. Already TMC
is learning a lot about the new power system. For example, one result from the new
engine design is its very light weight so that the car does not require a conventional
transmission. In turn, lightening the vehicle through special steels is a complementary
strategy with TMC’s increased cooperation with NSC to receive customized steel
production on a just-in-time basis (Rapp 2000).
Intelligent Transportation System 25 (ITS)26
                                         
25 Even in 1993 Toyota (1993) could summarize its evolving smart car approach as responding “to the needs of our
information oriented society” in which “automobiles are now increasingly equipped with navigation systems and
sophisticated communication devices. Cars are gradually becoming ‘intelligent vehicles.’ Toyota is developing and
introducing car electronics to enhance communication between people, automobiles, and society. Also, out of concern
for the natural environment, we are developing clean, fuel economical engines.”
26 According to Mr. Ohe, Manager of Toyota’s ITS project, Toyota has worked on this system for 25 years and he has
been involved all that time. As of 1998, TMC had spent over $1 billion on the project. The idea has been to develop a
packaged system that will be sold. It has two elements, the on-board computer inside the car and the external system
that controls road traffic and each car through its on-board computer. Matsushita and NEC are involved in building the
electronics and computer systems for the project such as the on-board navigation system that is part of the on-board
computer. NRI (Nomura Research Institute) and Mitsubishi Research Institute are involved in the software
development. The idea was to first develop a system for Japan that TMC and Nikko Research indicated would be
piloted as a second Tomei expressway between Tokyo and Osaka. This system would then be adapted and sold to other
countries. However, this timetable has been changed due to objections from the National Police Agency regarding
responsibility for accidents; the system, the car or the driver? Now, the initial test will be at Tsukuba in December 2000
with a full demonstration ready for Expo 2005 in Nagoya. Full introduction will then depend on negotiations with the
NPA but could take several years. For this reason, Toyota may introduce the integrated system overseas first since it
will be technologically complete and tested by 2005. See Exhibits 1 and 3 for Toyota’s projected evolution of ITS
through 2015 (TMC 1999a).
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Toyota has been exploring the development and use of ITS since the 1970s, but it
is only in the last few years that ITS, as a set of commercial products, has become full-
blown through a combined use of embedded software and external guidance systems.
There are currently two pillars to ITS. One is a multimedia system for managing the car
and the other is an external computerized traffic management system. Toyota and many
outside analysts see ITS as offering a tremendous boost to customer satisfaction as well
as being helpful to the environment and health by reducing traffic jams and accidents. In
Japan, ITS is organized around VERTIS (Vehicle, Road and Traffic Intelligence Society),
set up by the government, companies and universities in 1994. The estimate is that
“intelligent transport could reduce traffic congestion 50% in 10 years and 80% in 20
years. That would help achieve huge reductions in emissions of pollutants and
greenhouse gases” (Toyota 1997). Further the potential market for ITS related business
could exceed 2 trillion yen by 2005 (Toyota 1997). Some of this potential is already
realized through the sale of on-board information terminals that include high-level
navigation systems. TMC has developed these in conjunction with Japan’s Vehicle
Information and Communication System (VICS), another joint public and private effort.
In addition, Toyota has been a leader from the beginning in this too, and even in 1997 it
had a 45% market share of Japan’s two million installed navigation systems (Brogan
1997) that by April 2000 had grown to 5 million units.
TMC has stated its strategic goals and mission for ITS very clearly. Indeed it
“does not regard ITS simply as a sideline to its main business, but as an opportunity to
introduce new systems for the 21st C ntury that will manage problems created by traffic.”
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Further, by 2015, it expects the Japanese market for ITS related products and services
alone to exceed 60 trillion yen with the worldwide market a multiple of that. Thus over
the next several years Toyota will be working to realize its vision of ITS enterprises that
will support a more integrated mobile transportation system. To make this vision a
reality, it has divided ITS into five basic work areas. The first is the Intelligent Car,
where the car incorporates more sophisticated and complex systems and functions. This
view then supports and is the foundation for the other areas (Exhibit 2).
The second area is multimedia for the automobile or the “Internet on Wheels”,
which represents a new arena for mobile communications. The third area covers support
facilities that will achieve smoother traffic flow by coordinating vehicles and the
transportation infrastructure. The fourth is business and organizational logistics where
TMC will work with other firms to develop a comprehensive set of tools that will support
the more efficient transportation of goods and services through improved utilization of
the existing road system. The fifth area is new or radically improved transport where
TMC will work to develop transport systems for the next generation. By coordinating and
managing the interactive relationships among these five work areas, Toyota intends to
achieve growth and development as a “Total Mobility Company.”
“In the medium-to-long term, we are working to realize our vision of ITS
enterprises as a way to build a more integrated mobile society. To make that vision a
concrete reality, we have divided our ITS endeavors into five basic fields. The first is the
Intelligent Car, where the car itself is invested with higher functionality. This concept is
central to all the other areas. Second is the Car Multimedia, a new field of mobile
communications. In the third area, Facilities, we aim for smoother traffic flow by
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harmonizing vehicles and infrastructure. Under the fourth heading, Logistics, we seek to
build a comprehensive, efficient transport system. Activities in the last area, Transport,
are directed at the development of transport systems for the next generation. Through
comprehensive and organic interaction among these different fields, Toyota is striving for
Harmonious Growth in the twenty-first century as a Total Mobility Company,” (Toyota
1998a).
To the extent TMC is successful in not only meeting but leading the way to these
objectives, it will transform the nature of driving and the automobile as well as control
how the industry and vehicles evolve during the coming decades. This is because it will
be incorporating next generation ITS systems into vehicle development from the design
stage to support multiple driving systems that will transcend advanced navigation
systems to include automated driving and coordination with the transportation
infrastructure (Toyota 1998a). A key driver in pursuing this strategy is TMC’s belief that
“advances in traffic management will be accompanied at each stage by an expansion of
functions in the car itself,” (Toyota 1998a), an approach that includes “the fusion of
automobiles and information communications,”  (Toyota 1998a). This is one reason TMC
became an investor in DDI, which when combined with IDO and KDD will form one of
Japan’s new digital telephone systems, KDDI. It is also why the system it is developing
even for automatic toll-collection is a two-way system as opposed to the one-way
systems used in the U.S. such as EZ-Pass. Toyota wants to establish from the beginning a
transportation infrastructure through which the highway can sense and communicate with
each vehicle. It will then be easier to introduce more advanced functions as they are
developed or as permission is obtained from the government to use them. TMC’s smart
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design and smart production will in turn support this strategy through the ability to speed
model design and production to rapidly incorporate such new technologies and functions.
So smart design and production are integral aspects of TMC’s overall strategy for ITS.
Under the current and widely used navigation system in Japan, traffic data is
obtained from the National and Local police, this data then goes to VICS (Vehicle
Information) for editing and is subsequently relayed to a car’s navigation system. This
system has been operating very successfully since 1996 and most new cars in Japan come
with this feature. Indeed, there were about 5 million such systems in operation in the
spring of 2000 compared to 100,000 in the U.S. and about 50,000 in Germany. Using this
system, drivers can avoid congestion and take alternate routes. In addition to saving
customers time and frustration, the system has environmental benefits by reducing the
pollution from cars creeping for hours over congested highways, often near urban areas.
Socially, it will save on fuel for similar reasons. These impacts are why the Japanese
government has supported this effort by contributing to the public corporation
responsible for implementing the system and to which Toyota and its corporate partners
are selling their software and hardware. Toyota’s own proprietary system it is developing
for Japan is called Nihon ITS.
While planning began in 1990, the government’s plan was initiated in 1996, and it
envisions lots of technology and business spin-offs, the current proliferation of car
navigation systems being the most visible example. After it is working in Japan, TMC
plans to proceed outside Japan, and again the first manifestation appears to be car
navigation systems with Toyota agreeing to join GM’s North American geo-positioning
consortium. Now Toyota is in the process of introducing a “new generation traffic system
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‘ITS’ (including navigation systems like VICS and automatic highway bill system)” that
can be extended beyond the highway to include automatic account debiting for gas and
roadside services. Further it sees aggressive entry into ITS as part of its strategy to
establishing its base as a general vehicle company in the 21st Century while contributing
to social development. This effort includes making cars more “intelligent” through driver
supervision, visual information support, distance-control from other vehicles, transport
services and automatic driving (Exhibits1 and 3, TMC 1999a).
One part of making this system work is a direct extension of the car-related
multimedia business such as supplying traffic and travel information via in-car terminals
and telecommunications. These on-board systems will be coupled with facilities and
systems related businesses that will include automatic money charging systems and
parking control systems. There will also be value-added businesses related to improved
logistics via operational control systems for distribution and delivery. One example of
these latter systems has already been described in terms of Toyota’s own parts delivery
system. But in addition TMC’s ITS group is working with Coca-Cola on a similar project
to optimize Coke’s urban deliveries. Related to these concepts are transport service
businesses and comprehensive transportation services such as the pilot project with
Toyota City taxis or dual mode buses in Australia.
Toyota also sees multiple business interfaces. One is that TMC will be setting the
standard for the car and related transportation for the future -- effectively becoming the
Microsoft of the automobile, the way Sony is becoming the Microsoft of video games.
This system was memorialized in 1996 in the Transportation Efficiency Act in Japan.
There was a similar act in the U.S. called ISTEA that allocated $60 million a year for six
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years. The idea was that each country would do its own R&D and system research and
would then meet to exchange information on the status of their projects. A key aspect of
this R&D from Toyota’s perspective was the development of the on-board computer.
In current motor vehicles, each feature has its own controller or mini-computer.
Thus, brakes are controlled separately from fuel injection, and the navigation system,
telephone and radio have their own controllers. Therefore, if the car is going to be
controlled as a whole, there needs to be a single computer directly managing all aspects
of the vehicle. Under Toyota’s ITS, therefore, there would be a single PC for the vehicle
directly linked to the servos or small electromechanical switching devices that monitor
and control the vehicle’s various functions from braking to navigation to entertainment.
This PC’s operating system will be externally based, supported and controlled by an
Internet platform that Toyota is developing. The computer of course will have the
capability of not only controlling the car but also of displaying all this information to the
“driver” and the passengers. Higashi Fuji is currently working with Toyota to develop the
software to manage this car and communicate via the Internet while Nippon Denso will
manufacture the on-board computer to Toyota’s specifications. Toyota is building the
controllers that will dot the highways using its two-way communication system. In
developing the operating systems, though, Toyota has not started from scratch but is
borrowing from existing operating systems. But TMC is then modifying these to make its
own system based on its knowledge of the car in terms of both mechanics and electronics.
However, TMC has found that the people in Japan who are able to develop such
software are limited. So it has had to go to Asia and the U.S. to get the actual software
programs written once TMC itself had developed the basic idea of what it needed to have
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done along with the basic system. Nevertheless, TMC believes that other countries and
producers are way behind it in developing the on-board computer and the Internet-based
control and communication system, though Daimler-Chrysler is the closest. One
illustration of a possible three-year lead is in the sales of navigation systems. Whereas in
the spring of 2000 the U.S. had about 100,000 systems installed and Germany about
50,000, Japan had over five million, or over 90% of the global market. In addition, during
1999, Toyota and its partners launched a new much more sophisticated second-generation
system that even includes visual data on gas stations, convenience stores, and other
facility locations in addition to traffic and weather data. The next new and improved
version is being developed but to complete this phase will require the integrated on-board
computer described above and two-way communication.27 Th s is why TMC is working
hard in these areas and on its three major pieces, the Internet Application Package, the
on-board computer’s operating system, and the hardware in the car.28 The group that is
managing the process works in the same way as any other major TMC project since there
                                         
27 For the 1st and 2d generation systems the traffic data is collected by the police and transferred to VICS on a real time
basis. Planning for the first system began in 1990 and the government allocated 370 billion yen to infrastructure
investment. The system uses an integrated radio wave and infrared beacon receiver and was first introduced in the
Central part of Japan in eight prefectures (Tokyo, Saitama, Chiba, Kanagawa, Aichi, Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe) in 1996
with another 15 added in 1999. Since early 2000 all of Japan has been included and one can drive from one end of
Japan to the other and the navigation system will track the vehicle’s progress and display it on an interactive map with
geographic, road and local site information. The navigation system or “nav” has also been combined with a cellular
phone that gives audio information in addition to the visual data displayed on its display panel. One can also ask for
information on near-by restaurants, etc. from “MONET” or Mobile Network Real-time time travel information on
navigation screens. Toyota sells the hardware for this system both in its new cars and on a dealer installation basis. An
affiliate, Toyota Media station, which also provides the interactive MONET request service, is developing the software.
This latter company was only founded in the last five years. TMC also believes it and Japan lead in developing and
selling this kind of system, though Daimler-Chrysler was the first to have one in operation in Germany called ITGS.
The U.S. is relatively limited to a “help-me” or emergency call system such as GM’s Northstar system and Ford’s
rescue system. Also, Opel, VW and Daimler-Chrysler in Europe all have such emergency road service. But these
systems do not have the customer-oriented features of Japan’s current version nor are they building the basis for a full-
fledged ITS using a multiple-function two-way road communication system. Thus, while, Toyota’s system has
“Mayday” features, which include emergency road service and even health and accident alerts, it goes well beyond
what the competition currently offers.
28 Another reason for the on-board computer is the new hybrid powertrain or CNG that involves integrating an
electrical motor with a small gasoline or diesel engine and requires the on-board computer to manage the system
through sophisticated control technology. In this way ITS and CNG are actually converging.
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is someone from each application group or area assigned to the working group, and it is
presently pursuing two avenues.
The first approach is based on ISO (International Standards Organization)
discussions for harmonization of traffic control (TC 204). This is composed of 15
working groups, and Japan is working to get a common international standard in
cooperation with ITS America and Europe (ERITCO). TMC’s other avenue is a more
flexible approach since there are differences between countries on whether a real time
system such as Japan’s or a request version such as in the U.S. is appropriate. Also, the
U.S. situation is complicated by the fact that traffic and automobile related issues are
primarily handled by states on a state-by-state basis. So Toyota is designing its system
 and strategy to work even if there are multiple standards.29 In addition, like Microsoft,
Toyota believes if it has a system that works and can be introduced anywhere, it has a
good chance to become the de facto global standard, which as Mr. Matsushima at Nikko
Research notes is part of TMC’s long term strategy. In this way, Toyota products
including its cars will become part of a total delivery system, and its marketing approach
                                         
29 TMC noted that the hardware is being designed so that it can easily be adapted to U.S. telecommunication
frequencies and the applications are also being designed with American adaptation and adoption in mind. That is, the
working group knows what the standard will be in each country, and it will develop connector interfaces as required to
meet standards according to the particular country in which the car and its navigation system will operate. In Japan, of
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will be to sell the system not just the cars!  Further, customer service is embedded into
the final product and continues after the actual sale.
Part of the next generations of ITS and navigation systems will be AHS
(Advanced Cruise-Assist Highway Systems) and TMC’s automatic driver. These systems
will help guide or actually take drivers to their destination via the shortest or if there is
congestion fastest route (Exhibits 1, 2 and 3). It knows how to go and can help the car get
there more safely and more quickly through such features as automatic sensing and
adjustment for distance between cars. In fact, AHS is an intermediate stage towards
automated driving where “vehicle operation is automated through interaction with the
road infrastructure, so that braking and acceleration are done automatically for safe and
smooth driving.” It uses magnetic markers in the road and magnetic sensors in the car to
control steering while on-board radar detects and avoids obstacles (TMC 1999a). This
illustrates why TMC has planned to introduce a two-way system from the start. Similarly,
it is developing “intelligent intersections” that alert “drivers and pedestrians to
approaching vehicles and gives road information and instructions using programmable
display panels.”
Toyota has already piloted some of the ITS features such as best route guidance in
Toyota city with local taxis and has used it to solve its own logistical problem for timely
parts delivery. It has also sold a similar system to the Coke bottlers in Nagoya, vastly
improving delivery times and driver productivity. The latter is a single system involving
140 vehicles and 600 vendors (customers). Once it has been piloted, the system can then
be extended to either other Coke bottlers in other cities or to vendors such as convenience
                                                                                                                   
course, the group has developed the map navigation system, and TMC has a cross shareholding in the company
producing it.
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stores in other locations. In summary, TMC’s “Total Delivery System” “establishes a
communications network among shops, convenience stores, vending machine, trucks,
logistics centers, etc., and provides comprehensive management of the distribution of
goods.” 30 TMC’s “Total Delivery System” can thus establish a communications network
among shops, convenience stores, vending machine, trucks, and logistics centers that
provides total management of goods distribution. The result is improved operating
efficiency and better inventory control in ordering and receiving including the goods in
the trucks.
Ultimately this can lead to computer-controlled driving or “automated vehicle and
highway systems” (Exhibits 1 to 3, Toyota 1999 & 1998a, Matsushima 1998). While
such systems are not widespread, they do exist and will be increasingly demonstrated
such as at the Nagoya 2005 Expo. One automatic driver system is currently being piloted
in Australia and another in Essen, Germany. In these cases, the cities have Dual-Mode
Buses that have their own special road and are automatically driven. Then when the buses
need to be driven off the special road, they convert back to driving as a normal bus.
Toyota calls this is the kind of system an “Intelligent Multimode Transit System (IMTS)”
that “combines the advantages of trains and buses.” It includes the platooning of
commercial vehicles31 and is what TMC would like to introduce later in this decade in
terms of a second Tomei expressway that would be a special track along the existing
road. TMC does not expect building this special lane to be physically or technologically
                                         
30 Expanding this potentially important business channel may be one reason behind TMC’s 10% investment in the “e-
retsu” group being formed around Family Mart’s over 5000 convenience stores. In May 2000, Family Mart (50.5%), C.
Itoh (14.5%), NTT Data (10%), Toyota (10%), Dai Nippon Printing (5%), JTB (5%) and Pia (5%) formed a new “e-
retsu” company, famima.com.  It will operate websites and place terminals in Family Mart stores and offer tens of
thousands of goods through the chain’s on-line markets.
31A similar use is the “intelligent parking lot” that provides data on parking availability, guides the vehicles to spaces,
and collects fees automatically.
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difficult, given the Japanese government’s commitment to the project and current interest
in promoting public works. However, there are legal obstacles due to the issue of
responsibility in the case of accidents (footnote 26). Still, its development seems only a
question of time, while installation of the two-way interactive driver-assist system can
gradually evolve into a fully automated driving system on a large scale. This will give
Toyota a big jump on other producers, especially compared to the U.S. where such efforts
would involve state and Federal legislation (Matsushima 1998).32 In ddition, Nikko
Research (Matsushima 1998) claimed that the system was “almost perfect,” and that
Yamato Transport, the package delivery service, was planning to use the technology for
its inter-city trucks once it was available.
Information Technology Infrastructure and Project Selection33
Toyota’s basic information system is a typical Japanese “three-tier” mainframe
system similar to most other large Japanese companies (Rapp 1995).34 The mainframes
                                         
32 “Intelligent Transportation Systems, Applications,” (ATIP00.013, 3/99) provides an overview of Japan's Intelligent
Transportation System (ITS), and several associated applications that are being developed. The associated website is
http://www.atip.org/public/atip.reports.00/atip00.013.pdf
33 The data in this section is based on a meeting with Mr. Nagane, General Manager of Systems Planning Division, and
Mr. Kida on 7/28/98 in Toyota City to discuss TMC’s systems operations and plans, also Fujimoto (1999).
34 The mainframes control servers that control the networking system and communicate with the plants and their
equipment as well as dealers and suppliers. The mainframes have the task of scheduling production and just in time
parts delivery as well as tracking orders. TMC uses a client server system but the client servers are mostly mainframes,
though physically the mainframes are getting smaller as is the disc-storage space. TMC’s system has hundreds of
million lines of code. So this is a huge system. Yet in 1998 there was no direct link between information embedded in
the car and its on-board computer and the data or systems used in the factories and offices, though this may evolve.
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manage a series of servers that manage the PCs and workstations. In addition, because it
is a real time on-line system, it has been totally integrated with TMC’s own business
operations, as is typical of most large Japanese firms. It is completely managed and
maintained by Toyota’s internal systems group. Internal communication depends on
TMC’s own fiber optic system and its own customized middleware that provides the
interface or bridge between different users within TMC.
These systems and communications are in turn critical to order processing and
tracking as well as to JIT production since parts must be ordered and delivered in a
synchronized manner with the production schedule. The clear objectives of better
communication, improved plant productivity, and increased client satisfaction (i.e. better
quality at a lower price) have in turn enabled TMC to select, develop and use the IT
required for each function and to integrate it into the total support system. This is because
Toyota can measure whether these objectives have been achieved. Except for the
operating systems, TMC has generally developed its own software and IT systems.
TMC now has about 1000 servers throughout Toyota, which tie various pieces of
the corporation together, including the 30,000 PCs that it bought for every office worker
in 1996. The basic IT strategy is to use systems to enhance existing strategies and
organizational structures. Indeed, since Toyota is processing 200 times 10,000 general
pieces of mail a day paper use is starting to come down. At the same time, Toyota does
not plan to increase the number of PCs. Conversely, the number of CAD/CAMs is 3000,
and TMC would buy more or upgrade them if it could increase the speed at which its
engineers could work or if Toyota hires more engineers.
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In 1998 Mr. Nagane was approached by Peoplesoft to buy an enterprise
management (EMS) package covering accounting, finance, and personnel. This was the
first time he considered buying such an outside package, and he began using it from
1999. The reason was because it was cheap and would allow Toyota to create a global
standard because as it has globalized, the company has seen the need for a global system
in these areas. Thus globalization is what pushed this consideration. But for the
production system (Total Production Factory or Toyota Production System), TMC
continues to use only customized software since this is the core of its operation, whereas
accounting, finance and personnel are secondary since the systems are just keeping track
of cash.
The firm’s on-line parts ordering system is now also global, but it is not yet on a
24-hour basis. Furthermore, TMC still uses batch-processing for parts ordering once the
production schedule it set. In Japan, this ordering is done daily, whereas internationally it
is done weekly; so TMC must carry some inventory as a result. The way the system
works is that the parts’ orders for tomorrow’s production are set. That is, the central
computer specifies the car ID numbers that are going to be produced. The server also
decides which location is best to have that car produced. Once that has been decided, the
server notifies the parts makers who are on-line 3 hours before as to where the parts
should be delivered. This is the type of assembly control TMC currently has. The central
main computer decides the cars to be produced and the specifications and sends a
message to the servers that communicate with the major parts makers who are now on-
line and have similar systems, and can notify their suppliers in similar ways. TMC’s
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production IT group has regular meetings with parts makers to make sure the system is
working right up and down the parts-supply chain.
The group also meets with computer makers regularly. These are Fujitsu and IBM
for mainframes and Tandem as a fault tolerant back-up support since Toyota cannot
afford to have the system go down. This would disrupt the entire assembly process,
which is unacceptable. They also meet with DEC, Sun, and HP for CAD/CAM and
engineering workstations. On PCs, TMC uses IBM, HP, Compaq, and DEC with a Unix
operating system. If the UNIX system did not to work for some reason as the system
evolves, then Mr. Nagane would recommend a switch to Windows, but not yet.
TMC’s overseas operations are still independent with respect to their IT systems,
though as noted above Toyota is trying to introduce a global standard for at least some
software. However, the company may end up dividing the operation into inside and
outside Japan systems. So for example, outside Japan TMC uses almost 100% HP,
whereas inside Japan it does not use HP so much. Globalization is one area Mr. Nagane’s
group is working on since it is often a problem getting domestic and overseas systems to
communicate. The Network in Asia, called the “Kikan System”, for instance is working
reasonably well except in India where the communication infrastructure is really bad.
Mr. Nagane also acknowledged that Toyota’s use and interest in IT had expanded
dramatically since 1994, and some requirements were highly specialized. TMC thus
decided to reorganize software development and as part of the reorganization (Rapp
1995), they spun off five software development subsidiaries (footnote 22), which are all
Toyota majority-owned.  The first is for telecommunications, including what happens
inside the car. The second is CAE (Computer Aided Engineering), which includes
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simulations. The third is pure software development, a joint venture with Fujitsu. The
fourth is a CAD/CAM joint venture with Unix, which is now part of Novell. The fifth is
TSI, which is a joint venture with IBM and Toshiba. In addition, TMC has an ownership
interest in IDC telecommunications (now sold to Cable and Wireless) that is supporting
Motorola’s cellular system in Japan. Finally, Toyota has a major software effort related to
ITS (Intelligent Transportation System) that is a special organization formed about 5
years ago, though the research has been going on for over 25 years as explained above.
This group also handles development of the Multi-Media Station inside the car as well as
taxi navigation since the systems use related technology based on a centralized car
computer.
To support just in time and assembly functions, the systems group in the company
maintains an extensive database for parts, which contains all the parts for the cars TMC is
producing or has produced, for both current production and replacement part
requirements. This data not only includes specifications but which company produced the
part and for which cars. Thus, in addition to knowing who is producing current
production by model Toyota can also trace particular parts in terms of warranty,
insurance claims, etc. This serves several functions in terms of after-sales service as well
as design and production improvements. Similarly, Toyota has a database for completed
cars that again is related to warranty claims, repairs and marketing but this also has
implications for design and production changes needed to improve reliability and quality.
These assembled cars are cross-referenced by factory and assembly. PCs are used to
access this database, which is why every employee has one. This procedure has created
various security problems as well as issues related to determining how different
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information is being used. But since information sharing is critical to the company’s
success, it sees no alternative. Nevertheless, while the network is live and on-line,
materials purchasing is still cumulated and done on a batch basis.
As of 1998, most of the software used by Toyota has been developed by Toyota,
or developed via captive subsidiaries (except for accounting where it is using a package it
has adapted to its system as well as one to keep track of temporary or hourly workers).
The overseas factories also have their own systems, some of which are packages. These
latter systems are basically separate, i.e. not integrated, but the subs are connected via a
global network the company has developed. So TMC communicates data on distribution
and the total global supply chain by sending data back and forth in a preprogrammed
format. For example, TMC would send information concerning production of certain cars
to the dealer network in the U.S.; so those dealers would then know when those cars had
been produced and were going to be delivered. Or Toyota would send orders to overseas
suppliers for parts. So it uses IT to manage both the sales and production of its global
system. Global marketing particularly is a primary function of e-mail in addition to global
intercommunication and coordination among various units, subsidiaries, and suppliers.
As Mr. Nagane explained, the purpose of IT is not to change the system or
operation strategy, which works very well, but to enhance it. It does this by speeding the
transmission of information and especially by eliminating the paper chain that is basically
costly and more subject to human error or lost orders. Thus the Kanban system, which
originally had been paper-based, is now IT based and uses computers and CRTs.
Though Toyota has considered using the Internet for allowing customers to purchase
cars, it has found this does not yet work well. In addition to dealer complaints, it found
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there was just too much that had to be done in terms of registering the car and meeting
various regulations, especially in Japan. However, what TMC has introduced is an
interactive website and database particularly oriented at younger people, where these
potential customers can introduce their own ideas for cars or design their own car on-line.
This completed car can then be priced, etc., and the customer referred to a nearby dealer.
In addition, Toyota can track the kinds of cars or features that appeal to young people.
It can then use this data to design cars that are more appealing to the next
generation, one of its prime strategic marketing programs. So it is using the web globally
for direct marketing but not yet for sales in Japan. Further, in the U.S. once you want to
buy the car, you can communicate with a local dealer directly and then just pick up the
car once payment and/or financing is arranged on line. These websites, including the one
in Japan, operate on a real time basis. The data can be accessed using e-mail. Because all
employees have their own PCs, they can also access this data as well as communicate.
However, it has taken time to get executives to change their habits and to actually use e-
mail to communicate rather than phone or call direct meetings. Change is coming.
In terms of buying new PC operating systems, i.e. upgrading, TMC upgrades
about every 5-6 years in terms of hardware and software, even though the software
producers are making upgrades about every 18 months. This is in keeping with Toyota’s
philosophy of using the simplistic least expensive way to achieve an objective and to
implement what works. Its experience is that it can get the functionality it wants based on
a 5-6 year cycle. Also, this insures reliability and usage since people are not constantly
changing their operating system or having to learn about added features, which most do
not use. Indeed, most people use the PCs for e-mail and word processing; so the existing
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PCs, operating systems, and software work fine. Also not buying the latest technology for
its own sake saves lots of money, not only in installing and debugging the latest software,
but in outright expense. A new PC plus software can run $2000 in direct costs. At 30,000
PCs, that is a $60 million purchase decision. In fact Mr. Nagane estimates each time
TMC upgrades its PCs the total all-in cost of each new system, including indirect costs
related to system integration, training, and support is 700,000 yen per PC or between
$6000 and $7000 each, raising the total corporate expenditure to about $200 million.
However, if there is some reason employees need an upgrade or a special
computer, they can always request it, and the request is evaluated on its merits. Further,
the same upgrade cycle does not apply to workstations and the CAD/CAM engineering
systems needed for design and engineering where upgrades are more frequent, though
such changes and software purchases are based on an engineering group’s actual
requirements. Thus the IT group must also work with Toyota’s parts suppliers to ensure
compatibility, so that designs and engineering data can be easily exchanged.
Software selection in all these cases is very pragmatic and hinges on the question
of the software’s contribution to the overall value of the car or the cost of designing and
producing a car versus the cost of the software whether purchased or developed. Thus
develop versus buy decisions are not made automatically but case-by-case based on
evolutionary learning. This is the same routine TMC uses to decide between designing-in
and ordering customized or standard parts for a car. It is also the decision process that led
it to reduced “fat design” (Fujimoto 1999), in terms of the number of options TMC would
offer customers for items such as steering wheels, when it discovered replacement part
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inventories were becoming too high. Therefore, it represents Toyota’s normal strategic
routine for introducing new technologies whether organizationally or in the car.
Summary - Controlling the Future
The effects on Japan’s automobile industry of the Asian Financial Crisis and the
after-effects of Japan’s Bubble’s collapse have polarized the industry into two groups,
Honda and Toyota, and everyone else. This reality has been reflected in the performance
of auto producers’ stock prices as well as their relative financial performance during the
1990s (Appendix II). Indeed, this polarization is fundamental to the industry’s likely
evolution since the weaker companies have been forced to restructure, reduce production,
and close plants. This general consolidation of their operations is thus gradually reducing
Japan’s excess production capacity of 3-4 million units (Keller 1997), but not sufficiently
to prevent the weaker firms from being propelled into the arms of the various
international auto groupings. So during 1999 and 2000 the remaining independent firms,
other than Toyota and Honda, were acquired by the groupings centered on large U.S. and
European manufacturers such as GM, Ford, Daimler-Chrysler, Renault and Volkswagen.
It is these foreign firms that will be determining their Japanese affiliates’ future
strategies.
Given these changes, Toyota’s market success and accumulated wealth have
helped it to build a strategic advantage in Japanese and Asian markets. This is because it
can afford to invest in geographic, product, and technology expansions that give it newer
more profitable products. These help it to further extend its lead in these areas relative to
Japanese competitors, while those competitors, except for Honda, find it difficult to
respond, putting them under additional competitive pressure. The result has been more
69
restructuring and dependence on the new global groupings. Though this situation may
have been beneficial for TMC in the short-run, in the longer run the large global
groupings and their Japanese affiliates pose a serious and long-term competitive
challenge. Given their greater financial resources and global reach, these reconfigured
groups can effectively challenge Toyota both in Japan and overseas markets. Further,
given different production locations, swings in exchange rates can affect competition in
various key markets.
Overlaying these Japanese industry considerations are various global industry
developments. Advanced country demand is fairly saturated, particularly the booming
U.S. market (Brogan 1997). Yet, within the U.S. and other advanced country markets,
there have been significant and rapid demand shifts. This situation puts a premium on a
firm’s ability to quickly design, develop and produce new models that incorporate new
technologies, especially electronics, and have a fresher look (Fujimoto 1999). On the
other hand, rapid emulation by competitors can lead to rapid profit deterioration even in
initially attractive segments such as minivans and light trucks (Brogan 1997).
 Another important strategic consideration is that the industry expects the largest
growth in demand to be in the developing countries with Brazil, China, and India
particularly targeted. Further, since these emerging countries are interested in the
technology spin-offs and development externalities from having an auto industry as part
their industrial base there are complex policy-related issues to efficiently meeting this
anticipated demand. While the Japanese industry would clearly prefer to export, this
option has been constrained (Appendix II) and FDI is the accepted option. At the same
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time, the form of the FDI, the type of car produced, and parts sourcing are all important
aspects of how this should be done and require sophisticated IT to support this strategy.
As described above, Toyota’s response to these various strategic considerations
has been a multi-faceted approach incorporating both product and organizational aspects
in which information systems are an important competitive tool. This approach has
included smart design, smart production and the smart car. Further, to reduce potential
emulation and to own the industry’s future evolution, it is working hard to establish a
global industry standard for smart cars such as the hybrid car in terms of environmental
standards or ITS for driving and transportation systems. This is a fundamental part of
TMC’s strategy.  In terms of the smart design component, the company is very customer-
focused and is using IT and the Internet to capture ideas from its customers. However,
this approach is an evolutionary extension of its smart marketing and sales strategy where
orders from customers and the dealers are fed directly by computer into the production
and assembly process. The production software system in turn is designed to support this
demand by producing cars to order.
In their study “Information Technology, Work Practices, and Wages,” Larry
Hunter and John Lafkas (H & L 1998) note two approaches to using IT in the workplace.
One automates existing practices to reduce skills needed to perform a task, “deskilling”.
The other enhances employees’ existing skills, extending capabilities and making them
more productive, “upskilling”. This is because H & L indicate that IT systems that
generate information as opposed to just automating existing tasks tend to be “skill-
biased” and support high performance work practices. They are “upskilling”, and such
“upskilling” usually improves existing skills, creates new ones, and leads to greater
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worker autonomy. Under these conditions, the IT system usually evolves and changes
with the job so there is a co-evolution of technology and work practices. As such
development is based on the firm’s original choices, it supports an evolutionary
understanding of IT’s use and how certain firms achieve best practice (Nelson and Winter
1982 and Fujimoto 1999). Further, since H&L correlate upskilling with higher wages and
strategy solutions, this approach should be preferred when possible.
From this perspective, one can see TMC has selected mostly upskilling IT in
developing its smart design, smart production and smart product IT systems to solve its
strategic problem due to improved plant use, productivity increases and more
sophisticated products. In addition, the smart car will change many competitive aspects of
the automobile industry. To differentiate its “smart” strategy from its competitors, TMC’s
management is depending on three basic elements. The first is its design, plant and
personnel infrastructure, including its proprietary IT systems; second is its smart car and
environmentally based product strategy; and third is its management’s evaluation of their
customers’ increasingly sophisticated and specialized transportation requirements.
Though difficult, TMC systematically collects, manages and analyzes the data
needed to link these elements together and to integrate that information directly with its
own sophisticated design and production scheduling systems. Tracking, marketing, and
delivering these products on a timely cost effective basis is a key aspect of TMC’s
success in implementing this strategy. At the same time, it must assure that product
development evolves in ways that are responsive to changes in customer requirements
and the technology within the car as well as in the technology used to design and produce
cars, parts and material inputs. This process therefore includes the IT used to control the
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overall process from order to delivery as well as the software embedded in the
automobile. In turn, TMC is constantly modifying these systems based on its
understanding of how they are working and could be improved as well as the feedback
from plants, dealers and customers. In this way TMC is constantly offering new and old
customers products tailored to their changing vehicle demands while the mechanisms to
design, produce and market these products quickly is also being adapted to changes in IT
technology, such as web-based ordering.
By getting the customer acquainted with TMC’s automated and customized
ordering system at an early date and by constantly and rapidly increasing the number and
quality of its services and products, TMC has improved customer contact, reduced
customer migration and kept costs low. The new smart cars will take this to another level.
Toyota is thus using IT to influence customer behavior and expectations and tie them to
TMC on an interactive basis, since the competition looks less advanced and sophisticated.
But for the strategy to work, TMC must efficiently gather and manage a wide range of
information about its client base and its changing demand for vehicles and transportation
so it can offer products in a customized and direct manner while constantly improving the
operation and its products’ client appeal. However, TMC does seem good at doing this as
well as at improving and managing the related organizational and customer complexity
needed to manage the technical complexities for cars and IT. As explained by Toyota,
trained personnel who understand auto production, automobiles and IT are critical to the
success of TMC’s strategy since all three technical streams are needed to develop new
cars, new car production technologies, and supporting IT systems.
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For example, to more efficiently meet customers’ order demands in as little as
five days, TMC has recently linked several processes that now enable the auto chassis
and the body to flow in parallel directly within the assembly plant (Fujimoto 1999) while
still using JIT parts supply. This effort helps reduce assembly time and in-process
inventories, but it requires combining auto-making expertise with IT system controls.
This close integration of organization, personnel and technology is very important since it
is well known that when conflicts arise among managers and employees in goal setting,
employees can sabotage the system and productivity improvements become limited
(H&L 1998; Fujimoto 1999). TMC’s approach of making the design engineers, assembly
plants and suppliers the users and stakeholders in the IT system’s development and
evolution therefore seems sound. This is complemented by simple, easily understood
measurable goals such as reducing production costs that are part of IT’s strategic
development and implementation.
As with other leaders in using IT, establishing eneficial IT loops with articulated
goals and outcomes is part of TMC’s IT utilization process. For example, using IT to
monitor customer requirements in terms of products (customization) and delivery (JIT
and replacement part inventories) keeps the information loop of orders, products and
delivery focused on the customer and repeat business. Such repetition for customized
vehicle orders and JIT delivery stabilizes revenues and increases TMC’s user base both in
terms of products and customers. This then reduces the fixed cost per vehicle while
enhancing the demand for high value added and smart products less subject to price
pressures. This justifies more IT investment to improve and expand the smart system,
including sales to other producers further building revenues while lowering fixed system
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costs. One clear case of this involves TMC’s tying of telecommunications and embedded
software in the smart car. The customer gains by taking less time to get from A to B,
while TMC gains since producers who cannot offer such vehicles cannot compete.
 Further, with “smart” supply capability order success is likely to be greater. This
reinforces dealer, supplier, and customer acceptance of the system and the smart design,
production and product concept. In turn, Toyota is building the basis for its own business
success, including client, geographic and product diversification. This helps to maintain
and expand its earnings and asset base. Given current economic and competitive
conditions domestically and globally, such developments are critical for its competitive
position compared to other producers. Further, to the extent that its smart cars or ITS
become a global standard, TMC will benefit from the fact such systems, software or IT are
protected by copyright. In addition, it can realize increasing economies due to user base
economics (Rapp 1998) where high development costs per unit are continuously reduced
by adding users (customers, employees, or suppliers), since the cost of the software is
mostly in the development, not in the reproduction. Combining intellectual property
protection with increasing returns then begins to emulate a Microsoft competitive model
with high returns protected from rapid emulation. A beneficial loop thus emerges such that
expansion and usage lowers unit costs, which can increase market share and user-benefits,
and thus expand the user base, which lowers costs. This results in a strong company that
finds it easier to retain customer and market confidence in an uncertain environment.
There are powerful benefits to such a strategy, especially for a capital-intensive
industry that is particularly vulnerable to diminishing returns due to rapid product
emulation and economic fluctuations. Furthermore, TMC’s integrated IT strategy extends
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the various important criteria for success in the auto industry explained by Womack et al
(1990) or Fujimoto (1999). This is because each IT investment decision relates to a
focused market strategy and fits within the totality of the firm’s investments including
links to auto design and production technology as well as the employees’ knowledge base.
TMC’s managers understand this and take advantage of the interlocking nature of
investments in machines, IT, employee skills, HR practices, and organization as well as
their complementary relationships (Fujimoto 1999).
This view includes recognizing that technology and human organization must be
linked in their development because they need to evolve and improve together. Thus, the
company as whole has demonstrated the capacity to learn on an evolutionary basis, which
Fujimoto calls organizational evolutionary learning in which strategy and implementation
are aligned so they support each other and improvement is continuous, kaizen (Imai 1986
and Fujimoto 1999). In turn, this evolution is based on TMC’s vision of how it sees
global automobile and transportation systems markets developing while it recognizes that
at the same time it must continue to raise the bar in terms of product quality and
technology, as well as efficient production. This perspective includes the conviction of
TMC’s chairman, Mr. Okuda. Furthermore, the emphasis at TMC along with the other
leading IT users is on effective use of automation to gain quality or productivity
advantage as opposed to being on automation’s cutting edge for its own sake (Fujimoto
1999). Indeed, automation for its own sake was found to be inefficient at other auto firms
due to frequent line stoppages combined with the high cost of maintenance personnel.
However, TMC can be on the IT technological frontier when it is necessary to improve
its long-term competitive position as demonstrated by its work on ITS (Exhibits 1 & 2).
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In this way one can see that TMC is using IT to control every aspect of its
business, from sourcing to delivery to after-sales support and even the very nature of the
product’s future development and how it will be used. Further, management, including
top management, now can view customer relations even more as an extended relationship
rather than as a set of transactions for a product with a known price. TMC is thus using
IT to impact its competitive environment by changing the way its customers look at
automobile requirements so as to favor TMC’s business strategy. At the same time, this
approach would appear to take TMC beyond a mere extension of the lean design and
production strategic model posed by Womack et al (1990). This is because smart cars
combined with smart design and production have already absorbed and moved beyond
the frontier explained in that study, though Womack et al’s view is still correct in noting
the competitive importance of TMC’s attention and commitment to ongoing
improvements in productivity and quality.
As explained above, the driver for TMC’s smart strategy has been its need to raise
the efficiency and emulation bar for its global group competitors, whose cost cutting and
market share goals have increased competitive pressures in all markets. Thus TMC’s
strategy has been to reduce the ease with such competitors can emulate its strategic,
technical and product advances with “me-too” responses using benchmarking and reverse
engineering. But by creating and implementing a new initiative that couples auto making
and organizational skills with proprietary IT systems, including embedded software,
TMC has moved a long way in this direction since competitors do not have access to the
IT element. This would seem to be a well-developed, though still evolving, “Controlled
Production” paradigm (Rapp 1998a and 1999a), an approach several leading Sloan study
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IT firms appear to use. That is, these firms including TMC are using IT not only to
control all aspects of their businesses, but also to directly influence the external
environment to their strategic advantage. Because TMC is especially good at this, the
interactive process should reinforce its analysts’ ratings as the world’s top auto company
in business and IT strategy and thus its future leadership position.
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Exhibit 1
Promotion Plan for Intelligent Transportation System
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Exhibit 2






Summary Answers to Questions for Toyota – Auto Strategy & Operations
General Management and Corporate Strategy Yes   No
Has the firm integrated IT into their management and production
strategy, including using it to institutionalize organizational
strengths and capture tacit knowledge on an iterative basis?
x
Has the firm succeeded solely on the basis of its software strategy?x
Does firm believe some customized IT and its close organizational
integration enables it to capture and perpetuate on a more consistent
basis tacit knowledge and unique corporate features, i.e. core
competencies, that account for its continued success in the market
with reliability and repetition important elements in its thinking?
x
Is firm’s IT strategy successful because it is well managed and
introduces IT innovation when it serves corporate goals for
enhancing productivity or customer relations within its industry?
x
Does the division generally meet established criteria as a quality
organization such as: effective organizational self assessment, use
of project and especially cross functional teams, improving quality
outcomes through reducing uncertainty, rapidly diffusing learning
throughout the organization including the use of software and
information technology, effective implementation of organizational
and technical change, facilitating change via evolution rather than
revolution or reengineering35, emphasizing participatory
management, having process excellence, using value added
analysis, actively doing benchmarking, constant organizational
improvement, commitment to concrete realistic goals, effectively
managing a dynamic iterative experimental process through goal
setting, training and constant consultation?
x
Does the firm plan in detail for operational excellence including the
contribution of IT to the allocation of resources?
x
Do planning systems enable management to make better business,




Do projects focus on small number of IT goals, usually 3 or fewer,
with a well-defined system reaching from the commitment of senior
management to the department level with associated metrics?
x, Not cl ar
                                         
35 MIT Systems Dynamics Group in 9/97 presentation estimated 70% of reengineering efforts fail.
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Is the firm a “high performance” workplace for services??
Is there a heavy emphasis on improving process through IT?x
Industry Related
Are industry economics & competition important strategic drivers
for firm’s IT use in that IT is adapted to its competitive situation?
x
Are there industry paradoxes: falling stock prices, production
improvements that create product improvement difficulties, or
employees’ active product use that retards improvements?
x
Competition
Is IT a significant successful input into the firm’s competitiveness?x
Does the firm explicitly and consciously perceive implications of IT
strategies and use on its competitiveness and business success?
x
Are there direct links from IT strategies to overall management
goals?
x
Do customers, affiliates, competitors, industry analysts, government
officials, industry associations and suppliers perceive the
competitive benefits or impact of the firm’s use of IT?
x





Is firm a sophisticated software user that consciously designs and




Does firm combine several types of IT to achieve an advantage?x
Does firm’s system rapidly uncover implementation barriers,
including using new or better IT, while generating cross-functional
and hierarchical consensus so measured goals are achieved?
x, culture
Is leadership at different levels actively involved in IT planning,
assessment and deployment with regular progress reviews that link




Does system allow for flexibility and innovation plus change and
individual efforts if goals, planning and metric criteria are met?
x
Is there a clear vision making project and new software selection
straightforward and closely related to strategic goals and processes?
x
Does firm’s IT strategy involve conscious clearly defined reliance
on customized and semi-customized software in addition to
packaged software with specific criteria and goals for selecting each
type, and does it have ways to measure this so the firm knows
customized software achieves functional or market gains that justify
the added expense, including related costs of integrating customized
and non-customized software into a single information system?
x
Does firm use option valuation methods to manage uncertain
random outcomes, since this approach even among very well
managed companies is at IT implementation frontiers?36
x
Does strategy include more use, development, integration of firm
specific and industry vertical application IT and embedded SW in
production & delivery processes to improve competitiveness?
x, ITS,
Hybrid Car
If firm has embedded SW strategy, is it integrated or interactive
with other IT and business strategy in ways affecting delivery,









Does firm believe large-scale outsourcing by many US companies
assumes those firms’ IT systems development need not be
integrated with their business organization and that they view their
IT systems as generic products best developed by outside vendors
who can achieve low cost through economies of scale? That is, do
they feel these firms’ approach focuses on software costs and such





Does it believe this is a mistake by competitors that gives it a long-
term and sustainable advantage over such companies because it
believes outsourcing surrenders firm’s strategic IT options as
systems service companies tend to develop increasingly
x, view on
ANX
                                         
36 Easton, G. S. and S. L. Jarrell, “Using Strategic Quality Planning More Effectively: Lessons Learned from NSF
Project Research,” Columbia Business School conference presentation, September 1997
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standardized products one step removed from company’s customers
and business?
Has the firm established a software strategy that is open and












Does firm embed software into its production and delivery
processes with competitive market implications?
x, ITS
Is IT technology tied to high speed telecommunications technology,
allowing the firm to track, receive and deliver shipments or services









Does it work to ensure consistency and reduce programming errors?x
Is informal interaction key aspect of planning and implementation?x
Is firm’s IT system institutionalized and self-reinforcing with good
communication and consensus building while IT plays a role,
including preventing retrospective goals or target reduction?
x, inter-
active
Human Resource and Organizational Issues
Does firm pay close attention to systems training and organizational
integration for all employees, reducing errors through improved
consistency and staffing efficiencies across the firm since software
can confound even routine operations?
x, culture






Does the firm try to change human behavior to use software? x
Parameter Metrics - Inventory, Cycle Times and Cost Reduction
Are goals linked regularly reviewed metrics with inputs coming
from all levels, often cross-functional affecting large parts of the




Does the firm have standard agreed ways to explicitly organize or
manage this IT selection process?
x, form
teams
Does the firm have agreed ways to measure and evaluate success in
using software to promote objectives such as lower costs, contract
time, market share, product development times, or system support?
Ye
x  cost o
function
No
Are IT costs balanced against overall long-term productivity or
revenue gains?
x
Does the firm have methods to ensure increased customization costs
result in lower costs downstream so developing and using
customized software makes sense?
x
Has the firm created large interactive databases to allow automatic
feedback between stages or players in the production and delivery
process? And are these databases constantly being refined and
updated on an interactive basis with actual performance results in a




Are there competitive and metric impacts such as reducing
inventory costs and wastage while improving the quality of
customer service?
x
Has the firm used IT to create beneficial feedback cycles that
increase productivity, reduce cycle times and errors, and integrate
product and delivery?
x
Do other firms or analysts have alternative measures of
competitiveness or views on the appropriate industry strategy?
x, Not
noted
Has firm achieved better than industry growth, superior delivery,
improved control, reduced down-time or changeover problems,
reduced product or process errors, fewer complaints, an improved
product development process, and/or any other definite and
measurable progress relative to competitors?
x, lead
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Do the firm’s metrics go beyond financial to areas like customer
satisfaction, operational performance, and human resources?
x, surveys
Does firm’s evaluation system apply to new product development





Conclusions and Results       Yes    No
Can you summarize mission statement on the role and impact of IT
as a tool of competitive advantage for this firm in this industry?
x, st ted
vision
Is it consistent with strategies identified as successful or appropriate
in competitiveness research from Sloan’s industry study center?
x, 1990
book
Are there important business or IT situations requiring further
research?
x, follow-up
Are intellectual property issues important in explaining firm’s




Are beneficial cost impacts generally an important consequence of
this firm’s successful software strategy?
x
Does this company fit a profile where IT seems most likely to
contribute to enhanced competitiveness?
x
Based on this study is the market for vertical application and
embedded software growing?
x
Since Japanese competitors normally do not outsource, do Japanese
firms see themselves as benefiting from this US trend?
x, possibly,
e.g. ANX
Does this leading U.S. firm assign positive value to improved
integration and enhanced control through selective customization?
x
Do general measures such as decreased costs evidenced by reduced
account servicing expenses reflect benefits successful IT strategy?
x
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Are the benefits of a successful software strategy also reflected in





Does this leading IT user have explicit criteria for selecting package
versus customized software and for semi-customizing IT packages?
x, cost or
function
Does this firm closely integrate or couple its IT and business
strategies beyond mere alignment?
x, integral
Does it closely integrate its organizational and HR policies with its
IT systems?
x




Has IT codified or built on existing organizational strengths or core
competencies, including HR alignment business and IT strategies?
x
Have they embraced and integrated IT as part of their business
strategies and core competencies?
x
Is MIS function integrated with the rest of consumer bank in terms




SOME INDUSTRY AND FIRM DATA
Table 1 -Toyota’s Position within the Japanese Auto Industry 1983-1998
(Millions of Vehicles)
Year Toyota Japan Production Industry  Toyota Industry Toyota
Cars Truck/Bus Total Total Exports Exports Global Sales (O)
1983 2.4 0.9 3.3 11.1 1.7 5.7 3.3 (1.7)
1984 2.4 1.0 3.4 11.5 1.8 6.1 3.4 (1.8)
1985 2.6 1.1 3.7 12.3 2.0 6.7 3.8 (2.1)
1986 2.7 1.0 3.7 12.3 1.9 6.6 3.9 (2.1)
1987 2.7 0.9 3.6 12.2 1.8 6.3 3.9 (2.1)
1988 3.0 1.0 4.0 12.7 1.8 6.1 4.4 (2.2)
1989 3.1 0.9 4.0 13.0 1.7 5.9 4.4 (2.1)
1990 3.3 0.9 4.2 13.5 1.7 5.8 4.9 (2.4)
1991 3.2 0.9 4.1 13.2 1.7 5.8 4.7 (2.4)
1992 3.2 0.8 3.9 12.5 1.7 5.7 4.6 (2.4)
1993 2.9 0.7 3.6 10.6 1.5 4.6 4.5 (2.4)
1994 2.8 0.7 3.5 10.6 1.5 4.4 4.5 (2.5)
1995 2.6 0.6 3.2 10.2 1.1 3.6 4.6 (2.5)
1996 2.8 0.6 3.4 10.3 1.3 3.8 4.8 (2.6)
1997 2.9 0.6 3.5 11.0 1.5 3.7 4.8 (2.8)
1998 2.7 0.5 3.2 10.0 1.5 3.3 4.6 (2.9)
Source: TMC 1994 and 1999 and Brogan (1997); in 1998, Toyota’s market share of 29.1% was about twice Nissan’s (15.4%)
and almost three times Honda’s and Mitsubishi’s. If Hino and Daihatsu are included, the g oup’s share rises to 37%. Also
between 1989 and 1998, overseas production, mostly in North America, grew from 472,000 to 1.5 million.
Table 2 - Toyota’s Japanese Market Share 1989-98 (TMC 1999)
Year 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Share 31.8 32.2 31.3 32.1 31.9 31.3 30.0 30.2 29.8 29.1 (%)
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Table 3: 1986-1998E- The Global Light Vehicle Outlook – (Million Units)
Company/Year 1986 1988 1990 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998E
U.S. Passenger Car Sales
Big 3 7.85 6.91 5.82 5.10 5.45 5.73 5.51  5.40  5.20  5.00
Transplants 0.37 0.64 1.08 1.18 1.28 1.45 1.62  1.75  1.85  1.95
Total Domestic Cars8.21 7.54 6.90  6.28 6.73 7.18 7.13  7.15  7.05  6.95
Imports 3.19 3.00 2.40 1.94 1.78 1.81 1.51  1.45  1.35  1.25
U.S. Light Truck Sales
Big 3 3.66 4.17 3.81 3.98 4.63 5.20 5.30  5.60  5.75  5.50
Transplants 0.10 0.05 0.15 0.27 0.37 0.49 0.44  0.50  0.55  0.70
Total Domestic 3.76 4.22 3.96 4.25 5.00 5.69 5.74  6.10  6.30  6.20
Imports 0.89 0.61 0.60 0.40 0.38 0.40 0.39  0.40  0.40  0.40
Total U.S. 4.65 4.83 4.56 4.65 5.38 6.09 6.13  6.50  6.70  6.60
U.S. Light Vehicle Sales
Big 3 11.5111.08 9.63 9.08 10.0810.9310.81 11.00 10.95 10.50
Transplants 0.47 0.69 1.23 1.45 1.65 1.94 2.06   2.25   2.40   2.65
Total Domestic 11.9711.7610.8510.5211.7412.8712.87 13.25 13.35 13.15
Imports 4.08 3.61 3.00 2.34 2.16 2.21 1.90   1.85   1.75   1.65
Total U.S. 16.0515.3713.8612.8613.9015.0814.77 15.10 15.10 14.80
N.A. Production 13.2813.4512.2912.5613.86 15.2415.03 15.18 15.35 14.95
Western Europe
U.K. 1.88 2.22 2.01 1.59 1.59 1.78 1.91   2.03   2.12   2.13
Germany 2.83 2.81 3.04 3.93 3.19 3.21 3.31   3.51   3.65   3.80
France 1.91 2.22 2.31 2.11 1.72 1.97 1.93   2.13   1.96   2.04
Italy 1.83 2.18 2.35 2.37 1.69 1.68 1.73   1.74   1.98   2.02
Other Europe 3.24 3.58 3.53 3.49 2.88 3.17 3.10   3.42   3.48   3.67
Car Sales 11.6813.0013.2313.5011.2611.9412.02 12.82 13.19 13.66
Light Commercial 1.21 1.43 1.52 1.42 1.15 1.19 1.26   1.30   1.35   1.43
Total Sales 12.9014.4314.7514.9112.4113.1313.28 14.12 14.54 15.09
Total Production 12.1513.5113.6614.0311.8213.2713.91 14.35 14.75 15.30
Japan
Mini Vehicle Sales1.63 1.77 1.90 1.61 1.58 1.64 1.73   1.73   1.66   1.74
Other Vehicle Sales4.12 4.98 5.90 5.27 4.81 5.06 5.17   5.50   5.54   5.61
All Domestic Sales5.75 6.75 7.80 6.88 6.39 6.70 6.90 7.227.20   7.35
Exports 6.59 6.19 5.82 5.66 4.62 4.35 3.62 3.753.70   3.30
Total Production 12.2712.8213.5912.3310.8510.6210.09 10.54 10.44 10.13
Source: Salomon Brothers  (Brogan 1997)
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Table 4: 1993-2001E- Auto Firms Sales, Earnings and Profits (Unconsolidated) – (¥ Billions)
Company/Year FY93 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999E 2000E 2001E
Toyota’s Revenues 9031 8154 6164 7957 9104 7769 7480 7520 7500
% Cars 71.0 69.0 67.0 67.0 65.4 63.7 - - -
% Trucks 28.7 30.8 32.8 32.8 34.4 36.1 - - -
% Buses   0.2   0.2   0.2   0.2   0.2   0.2 - - -
Japan Production 3460 3502 3174 3501 3422 (1000 units) peak 4223 1990
Net Profit   116   111  111   183   303   365   255  311   340
Nissan Revenues 3897 3583 3408 3518 3690 3546 3430 3320 3300
% Cars 74.6 75.3 74.7 74.4 71.6 73.4 - - -
% Trucks 25.2 24.6 25.1 25.4 28.2 26.5 - - -
% Buses 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 - - -
Japan Production 1750 1589 1677 1663 1672 - peak 2380 1990
Net Profit -15.1    7.6  -61.0    3.6 51.3 16.5 -20.0 15.0 50.0
Honda Revenues 2695 2505 2469 2448 2846 3077 2890 2730 2690
% Cars 98.5 98.1 98.7 98.3 98.3 98.3 - - -
% Trucks   1.5   1.3 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.7 - - -
% Buses - - - - - - - - -
Japan Production 1127 982 956 1153 1328 - peak 1375 1990
Net Profit 30.1 14.3 21.6 26.5 90.3 128.0 127.0105.0112.0
Mitsubishi Revenues 2616 2456 2653 2523 2586 2501 2310 2270 2250
% Cars 51.1 48.9 45.8 46.0 53.0 61.9 - - -
% Trucks 47.7 50.0 53.1 52.9 45.7 36.4 - - -
% Buses   1.2   1.1   1.1   1.1   1.3   1.7 - - -
Japan Production 1325 1350 1284 1221 1175 - peak 1408 1991
Net Profit 20.2 16.0 18.8 20.5 15.0 -25.7 -46.0 -26.0 17.0
Mazda Revenues 2191 1769 1700 1443 1427 1512 1520 1470 1450
% Cars 66.3 66.8 53.8 59.8 68.4 72.9 - - -
% Trucks 33.7 33.2 46.2 40.2 31.6 27.1 - - -
% Buses - - - - - - - - -
Japan Production 982 931 771 781 873 - peak 1435 1990
Net Profit    2.6 -44.2 -35.8   0.4   6.1   11.5   17.0  17.0  17.0
Source: Nikko Research Center  (Matsushima 1998) – Assumes Yen at 130.
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Table 5: 1994-1998E- Auto Firms’ Capital and R&D Expenditures (Unconsolidated)
Company/Year FY 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998E – (¥ Billions)
Toyota’s Capital Expenses 227 293 313 344 360
R&D 400 450 438 428 440
Nissan Capital Expenses 109   64   74 106 130
R&D 154 162 168 208 220
Honda Capital Expenses   43   48   54   73   95
R&D 195 209 241 281 303
Mitsubishi Capital Expenses   83   87 102   78   50
R&D 112 106 120 126 131
Mazda Capital Expenses   27   16   22   34   50
R&D   54 51   59   70   80
Source: Nikko Research Center  (Matsushima 1998)
Table 6: 1991-2000E- Auto Firms’ Operating Profit Margin and ROE (Consolidated) – (%)
Company/Year       FY1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999E
Toyota’s Revenues - - 102119363 8121 10719122441167811400
OP Margin 5.07 2.15 1.78 1.45 3.15 3.25 5.43 6.68 4.56
ROE 9.79 5.12 3.72 2.62 3.57 4.97 7.02 7.77 5.31
Nissan Revenues - - 6198 5801 5834 6039 6658 6564 6300
OP Margin 2.11 2.28 -0.12 -2.48 -1.81 0.68 2.95 1.28 1.27
ROE 2.75 5.64 -3.17 -5.27 -11.0 -6.35 5.73 -1.06 -3.51
Honda Revenues - - 4132 3863 3966 4252 5293 6000 6150
OP Margin 3.41 3.49 2.63 2.03 2.72 3.38 7.58 7.71 8.13
ROE 7.02 5.47 3.49 2.37 6.20 6.55 17.5 17.4 17.3
Mitsubishi Revenues - - 3180 2947 3414 3537 3672 3735 3520
OP Margin 3.21 2.81 2.42 1.38 2.81 2.03 1.24 0.09 0.00
ROE 7.45 7.98 6.59 1.38 2.84 2.65 2.39 -24.4 -19.2
Mazda Revenues - - 2593 2188 2204 1842 1894 2041 2020
OP Margin 2.73 1.54 1.11 -1.65 -1.14 -0.45 0.01 1.62 2.23
ROE 6.63 2.24 0.31 -12.7 -12.1 -3.53 -5.37 -1.99 3.25
Source: Nikko Research Center  (Matsushima 1998). Forecast assumes Yen at 130.
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Table 7: 1990-1996- Per Unit Labor Costs – (Yen 1000)
Company/Year  FY1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Toyota 13.3 14.2 16.0 15.7 16.2 18.1 18.7
Nissan 17.5 17.9 18.7 20.3 21.3 20.1 19.8
Honda 17.6 18.9 21.7 23.1 26.3 28.0 26.2
Mitsubishi 12.9 13.6 13.7 14.1 13.9 14.9 15.6
Mazda 13.5 14.7 15.6 17.3 17.4 19.6 19.4
Source: Nikko Research Center  (Matsushima 1998)
Table 8: 1994-98- Firms Domestic, Overseas Vehicle Sales  & Production – (1000s units)
Company/Year FY94 1995 1996 1997 1998
Toyota’s Domestic Sales 2063 2084 2232 2006 1711
Exports 1441 1141 1312 1494 1463
Japan Production 3502 3174 3501 3502 3166
Overseas Production 1120 1283 1379 1388 1468
Nissan Domestic Sales 1049 1141 1135 1060
Exports   611   594   594   690
Japan Production 1589 1677 1663 1720
Overseas Production 1090 1055 1080 1091
Honda Domestic Sales   579   657 783 800
Exports   494   383 410 540
Japan Production   983   955 1153 1320
Overseas Production   824   904 1057 1070
Mitsubishi Domestic Sales   786   824 772 685
Exports   555   490 481 575
Japan Production 1350 1284 1221 1220
Overseas Production   633   671 763 810
Mazda Domestic Sales   410   391 377 380
Exports   574   420 445 560
Japan Production   931   790 781 900
Overseas Production   197   169 148 137
Total Japanese Production 1061010080 106401078010500 peak was 13591 in 1990
Source: Nikko Research Center  (Matsushima 1998) – Assumes Yen at 130. Forecast for 1999 and 2000 is domestic production
under 10 million vehicles.
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Table 9: Sources of Efficiency and Operating Profit Improvement 1994-97 (Billion Yen)
Company Better Design Rationalization Sales Yen Total
(Parent) & Production (Cost Cutting) Increase Depreciation  Up
Toyota 760   60 285 430   1501
Nissan   20 713   55 150     940
Honda   94 254     96 115     595
Mitsubishi   - 270   85   95     446
Mazda   - 419   -   49     481
Sales Yen Net R&D Total
Decrease Appreciation Increase Down
Toyota     160     360 180     762
Nissan     365     270   18     704
Honda     110     155 107        377
Mitsubishi     237     187   12     446
Mazda    246     226     3     475
Source: Adapted from Nikko Research Center (Matsushima 1998)
Net Improvement Period: Toyota – 739; Nissan – 238; Honda – 218; Mitsubishi – 0; Mazda – 6
% Parent Revenues: Toyota – 2.3%; Nissan – 1.7; Honda – 2.1; Mitsubishi – 0; Mazda – 0.1
Table 10: Firms’ Consolidated Yen Sensitivity - 1997 (Billion Yen)
Company Overseas RevenuesChange Pretax % U.S. Sales from
% Revenues FY 95Profit per ¥1/$ FY97 N.A. Production CY96
Toyota 45.2  16.0 64%
Nissan 48.2   7.0 60%
Honda 63.8   6.9   82%
Mitsubishi 43.9   3.2   67%
Mazda 55.7   2.8 54%
Source: Salomon Brothers (Brogan 1997)
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Table 11: Key Firm Data – Toyota Motor Corporation (Parent only)
6/93 3/99 (TMC 1999)
FY Revenues (Billion Yen) 9030.9 7525.5
Net Income (Billion Yen) 115.5 267.2
Vehicle Production (1000s)* 4820.0 4634.1
Domestic 3931.3 3165.8
Overseas   888.7 1468.2
Vehicle Sales (1000s) 3927.1 4641.0
Domestic Sales 2228.9 1711.0
Exports 1698.2 1462.8
Overseas Sales 2586.9 2930.0
Total Capital 260.5 397.0
Employees 71000 68000
Return on Capital (%) 44.3 67.3
Source: Toyota (1994 and 1999). In calendar 1992, Toyota’s domestic auto production was roughly 3.2 million cars
with 1.3 million exported. This production was up from 2.4 million in 1983. Their domestic market share was 32%
in 1992 compared to 29.7% in 1983
Firm Data (billions of  ¥en – Consolidated))1997 (3/97)1998 (3/98)1999 (3/99)
ASSETS & LIABILITIES
Cash and Short-term Money Claims 1855 1769 1980
Receivables 1480 1377 1359
Inventories     562   727   765
Other Current Assets 1943 1556 1595
Fixed Assets 4094 4682 4862
Land   653   682   828
Construction in Progress   235 232   329
Other Assets 2771 4711 5182
Total Assets 12705 14822 15847
Automotive   6070 6934 7427
Finance   3404 4215 4446
95
Liabilities 7028 8275 9189
Equity 5677 6547 6658
Source: (TMC - Annual Reports 1997, 98, 99)
Table 12: Toyota’s Japanese Auto Market Share 1994 – 98E (Excluding Mini Cars)
Year 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998E(%)
Toyota 41.4 39.4 39.2 38.9 38.7
Honda   6.4   7.5 10.0 10.9 10.4
Nissan 20.7 21.3 20.4 20.2 21.4
Mitsubishi 10.0   9.7   8.9   8.2   8.3
Mazda   6.8   6.0   5.3   5.7   6.5
Imports   6.1 7.5 8.0   7.1   6.1
Large Cars 28.9 30.9 25.7 22.7
Source: Nikko Equity Research (Matsushima 1998)
Table 13: Forecast Japanese Automobile Unit (1000s) Sales 1992 – 2000E
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998E 1999E 2000E
Domestic Sales 4427 4154 4304 4466 4852 4190 4315 4270 4383
Exports 4415 3568 3268 2761 2968 3722 3660 3360 3280
Source: Nikko Equity Research (Matsushima 1998)
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